JUDGMENT

At last, after several false starts, it can be said, this is the Plaintiff’s application (enclosure 15) for an orderfor sale of the Defendant’s land held under Geran 1379 for Lot 16 Sek 5 Mukim Bandar Sungai Petani, Daerah Kuala Muda, Kedah together with premises known as 44, Jalan Ibrahim, Sungai Petani (hereinafter collectively called the said land) by public auction;for enclosure 15, even though filed some time back, on 15.2.1997, was held back all this while in abeyance, pending the disposal of multifarious intervening applications and appeals to Judge-in-Chambers, as the following summary of the proceedings to date wouldrelate.

On 22.6.1996, the Plaintiff filed the instant action. On 16.7.1996, the Defendant filed his Memorandum of Appearance, through Messrs Teja Singh Penesar & Co. Promptly, the Plaintiff filed, on 25.7.1996, an applicationfor summary judgment (enclosure 4). A month later, on 26.8.1996, the Plaintiff applied to attach before judgment the Defendant’s movable goods (enclosure 6). On 14.9.1996, the Defendant’s movable goods were ordered to be attached before judgment. On26.9.1996, summary judgment, in default of the Defendant or counsel, was entered against the Defendant for the sum claimed. On 22.10.1996, the Plaintiff applied for a Writ of Seizure & Sale. On 22.10.1996, a Writ of Seizure & Sale was issued. On 12.11.1996,the Plaintiff obtained an order prohibiting the Defendant from transferring, charging or leasing the said land, for a period of 6 month from 12.11.1996. Then, enclosure 15 was filed on 15.2.1997. On 25.3.1997, the Plaintiff obtained an extension of the prohibitoryorder for a further 6 months from 11.4.1997 (enclosure 19).

On 10.4.1997, the Defendant appointed Messrs Darshan Singh & Co., in place of Messrs Teja Singh Penesar & Co., as his solicitors. Thereafter, the Defendant filed severalapplications and several appeals to Judge-in-Chambers: on 10.4.1997, the Defendant applied (enclosure 24) to set aside the default judgment, for a stay of execution and for time to file a Statement of Defence; on 15.4.1997, the Defendant appealed (enclosure26) to Judge-in-Chambers against the order of the learned SAR extending the prohibitory order for 6 months, from 11.4.1997; on 30.5.1997, the Defendant appealed to Judge-in-Chambers against the order of the learned SAR dismissing the Defendant’s application(enclosure 24) to set aside the default judgment. On 6.9.1997, the Plaintiff applied (enclosure 33) and obtained an extension of the prohibitory order for a further 6 months from 11.9.1997. On 10.12.1997, the Defendant applied (enclosure 40) to set aside theorder of 11.9.1997 extending the prohibitory order. On 19.12.1997, the Defendant appealed (enclosure 42) to Judge-in-Chambers against the dismissal of enclosure 40. On 27.1.1998, the Plaintiff applied (enclosure 45) for the extension of the prohibitory order.On 2.3.1998, the prohibitory order was extended for 6 months, from 2.3.1998.

Now, to bring it to date, all the Defendant’s aforesaid appeals to Judge-in-Chambers, after full arguments were dismissed with costs and there are noappeals therefrom to a higher court. In the result, the default judgment is a final judgment. And, obviously, the Plaintiff is entitled to the fruits of the litigation.

In opposing enclosure 15, Mr Darshan Singh contended that a Writ of Seizure& Sale is the foundation of a prohibitory order and that a prohibitory order cannot exist on its own. In the instant case, he further contended, the Writ of Seizure & Sale had expired, on 22.10.1997, and that therefore, the prohibitory order, notwithstandingit has been extended until the present day, cannot subsists. Mr Darshan also argued that the Defendant was only one of the partners of Mohamedi Textiles and that the Plaintiff ought to have sued all partners of Mohamedi Textiles. He furthermore contended thatthe Defendant could raise the issue of nullity (and he meant that the judgment is null and void) at any stage of the proc