Arifin Zakaria Chief Justice:

I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my learned brother Mohd Ghazali bin Mohd Yusoff (FCJ), I agree that the appeal should be allowed on the premise that there was no request from the respondent for the appointment of committee of inquiry under general order 26(5) of the General Orders 1980. As such, the disciplinary board should not be faulted for failing to do so. I would, therefore, allow this appeal on that narrow ground.

I should also add that the facts in the present case can be distinguished from that of Mat Ghaffar bin Baba v Ketua Polis Negara & Anor Yusof bin Sudin v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Polis & Anor B Surinder Singh Kanda v The Government of the Federation of Malaya

In the present case, the respondent did not at any stage request for an oral hearing or for any document to be furnished to him. Therefore, he could not complain that such right was not afforded to him. It is for him to request for an oral hearing or for any document that he thinks could help him to prepare his answer to the charges levelled against him. In Mat Ghaffar bin Baba and Yusof bin Sudin, a request for oral hearing was made by the officers concerned, but was denied. The courts held that such refusal was unreasonable in the circumstances of the case and the courts went on to hold that the officers, in the circumstances, had not been afforded the right of hearing in its proper sense. On this ground, the decisions of the disciplinary authority were quashed.

For the above reasons, I would answer the question posed to us in the negative and the appeal be allowed with costs.

Mohd Ghazali FCJ:

The appellants (the defendants in the originating action) are the Government of Malaysia, the Police Service Commission, the Inspector-General of Police and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, respectively. The respondent (the plaintiff in the originating action) was formerly a police officer with the Malaysian Police Force holding the rank of Inspector. I will hereafter refer to the parties as they were in the High Court.

On 4 November 2010, this court granted the defendants leave to appeal on the following question of law:

Whether the opinion of the Disciplinary Authority that the case against the officer does not require further clarification through the appointment of a Committee of Investigation under general order 26(5) General Order D 1980, is subject to a review /scrutiny by the Courts.

THE BACKGROUND

Vide letter dated 27 September 1993 the Deputy Inspector-General of Police (the fourth defendant) informed the plaintiff of his intention to commence disciplinary action against the latter pursuant to general order 26 of the Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter D) General Orders 1980 (‘GO (Chapter D)’) with a view to his dismissal (‘the show-cause letter’). The show-cause letter contained five charges of disciplinary offences. The essence of the five disciplinary offences were as follows:

(a)found to be dishonest, to wit, receiving monthly bribes of RM1,000 between 1 January–30 June 1989, 1 August 1989–31 July 1990 and 1 September 1990–18 September 1990 from one Chong Lee Lin, an illegal four digit operator which is a disciplinary offence under general order 4(2)(f) of the GO (Chapter D);

(b)found to be dishonest, to wit, receiving monthly bribes of RM200 between 1 January 1987–31 March 1989 and RM300 monthly between 1 April 1989–21 September 1990 from one Khu Tee Sing, an illegal four digit operator which is a disciplinary offence under general order 4(2)(f) of the GO (Chapter D);

(c)found to have conducted himself in a manner likely to cause reasonable suspicion that he allowed his private interests to come into conflict with his public duty, to wit, having established a close relationship with illegal four digit operators, namely, one Chong Lee Lin and one Khu Tee Sing between 1 January 1987–21 September 1990 knowing that they were operating in Seremban and as such have committed a disciplinary offenc