Gopal Sri Ram JCA (delivering judgment of the court):

This is the judgment of the court.

This is an appeal by the public prosecutor against the decision of the High Court in Ipoh acquitting and discharging the respondents on the charge framed under s 39B(1)(a)Dangerous Drugs Act 1952s 34Penal Code

The learned trial judge acquitted the respondents on two main grounds. First, he found PW3 to be a witness unworthy of credit and therefore had his evidence impeached. Besides this he also held PW3's evidence to be wanting in credibility. Second, he held that there were insufficient circumstances to establish that the respondents had trafficked in the proscribed drug in question. Taking the first point, the learned judge's decision on the evidence of PW3 turned on what he considered to be material contradictions between the evidence of that witness in court and what he had stated in exh D20. In fairness to the learned judge it must be said that he listed the contradictions that warranted a finding that PW3 was a witness unworthy of credit under s 155(c)Evidence Act 1950

In Muthusamy v Public Prosecutor

A mere omission is hardly ever a discrepancy. The police statement is usually much briefer than the evidence.

Again in Dasu v State (1985) Cri LJ 1933, at p 1938 the court held as follows:

In order to see whether there is a contradiction by omission it is necessary to find out whether the two statements cannot stand together. It is also necessary to see whether the statement which the witness has made in the witness-box should have been made by him while reporting the matter soon after the incident. If the two statements made by the witness cannot stand together and the statement in the court is such that the witness would necessarily have made at the time of his earlier statement, then alone omission thereof can be considered to be a contradiction.

Applying the test in Dasu, we are unable to say with any conviction that the statements made by PW3 on oath would necessarily had been made by him in exh D20. Having read and reread both PW3's evidence at the trial and his police report exh D20, we are satisfied that objectively speaking he was a witness worthy of credit. Accordingly, in our judgment, the learned trial judge misdirected himself in a material particular by impeaching the credit of this witness. We would therefore restore PW3 as a witness worthy of credit. No taint should accordingly attach to him.

We now turn to the argument directed at the credibility of PW3. Learned counsel for the respondents in a very carefully formulated and formidable argument has submitted that whatever may be the learned judge's finding on PW3's credit this court should in accordance with settled principle not interfere with the trial judge's conclusion that the witness was not credible. In approaching issues of credibility it is always necessary to bear in mind the tests that a trier of fact should ordinarily apply when evaluating oral evidence. One of the tests is motive. The presence or absence of motive on the part of a witness is a relevant consideration which a trial court should take into account. See Tengku Mahmood v Public Prosecutor Public Prosecutor v Datuk Harun bin Haji Idris Public Prosecutor v Mohamed Ali

When a police witness says something that is not inherently improbable his evidence must in the first instance be accepted. If his evidence is contradicted by other evidence or is shaken by cross examination then it becomes the business of the magistrate to decide whether or not it should be accepted. In the absence of contradiction, however, and in the absence of any element of inherent probability the evidence of any witness, whether a police witness or not, who gives evidence on affirmation, should normally be accepted.

In the present case, the learned judge quite rightly found no evil motive on the part of PW3. His sole ground for rejecting the evidence of this witness as wanting in credibility were the contradictions in or conflict betw