Low Hop Bing JCA (delivering majority judgement):

APPEAL

On 16 July 2008, by a majority decision (Nihrumala Segara a/l MK Pillay JCA, dissenting) we allowed the appeal by the appellant Sistem Penyuraian Trafik KL Barat Sdn Bhd (‘SPRINT’) against the decision of the learned High Court judge who had dismissed the appellant’s application for leave to intervene in a land reference in which the first respondent, Kenny Heights Development Sdn Bhd (‘Kenny Heights’), had objected to the quantum of compensation awarded by the second respondent, the land administrator of the Federal Territory (‘the land administrator’) for compulsory acquisition of Kenny Heights’ lands.

Having granted SPRINT leave to intervene, I now give my grounds.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Kenny Heights’ lands were acquired on 17 February 2000 by the land administrator for the purpose of building the public highway known as SPRINT Highway (‘the Highway’).

SPRINT’s affidavit in support refers to and annexes the relevant portions of the privatisation agreement entered into on 23 October 1997 between SPRINT and the Federal Government (‘the privatisation agreement’) appointing SPRINT as the concessionaire of the highway.

Pursuant to the privatisation agreement, SPRINT has to bear the compensation. The compensation payable by SPRINT was also known to Kenny Heights from the outset.

Being dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation, Kenny Heights proceeded to the High Court by way of land reference.

In the land reference, SPRINT applied for leave to intervene and to lodge Form N under the Land Acquisition Act 1960. (a reference hereinafter to a s is a reference to that section in the Land Acquisition Act 1960 (‘the Act’), unless otherwise stated).

The learned judge of the High Court had dismissed SPRINT’s application for leave to intervene.

In refusing leave to intervene, the court below:

(1)questioned the very existence and validity of the privatisation agreement and the functions of the Highway Authority Malaysia, Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia (‘LLM’) under the Highway Authority Malaysia (Incorporation) Act 1980;

(2)drew an adverse inference against SPRINT for not producing the entire privatisation agreement; and

(3)declined to accept SPRINT’s obligations to pay the compensation pursuant to the privatisation agreement.

At the hearing of the appeal before us, learned senior federal counsel, Dato’ Abdul Karim bin Abdul Rahman, representing the land administrator did not resist the appeal by SPRINT. However, Kenny Heights objected vehemently.

LEGAL INTEREST

In submitting that SPRINT has no direct legal interest in the land reference and that the learned judge of the High Court is correct in dismissing SPRINT’s application for leave to intervene in the land reference, Kenny Heights’ learned counsel Mr Joy W Appukuttan relied on, inter alia:

(1)Pegang Mining Ltd v Choong Sam & Ors

(2)Tohtonku Sdn Bhd v Superace (M) Sdn Bhd

(3)ss 2 and 37;

(4)Universiti Malaya & Anor v Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur

(5)Sri Permata Sdn Bhd v PPH Realty Sdn Bhd

(6)Tai Choi Yu v Syarikat Tingan Lumber Sdn Bhd

(7)Menteri Besar Negeri Sembilan (Pemerbadanan) v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Seremban

(8)United Malacca Rubber Estates Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor Bahru & Anor

SPRINT’s learned counsel, Ms Rajashree Suppiah assisted by Mr Paramjit Singh contended that being the concessionaire of the LLM, SPRINT has a direct legal interest in the compensation for the lands acquired and should be granted leave to intervene and lodge Form N in the land reference. They cited:

(1)O 15 r 6(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Rules of the High Court 1980;

(2)ss 2 and 37;

(3)Magasu Sundram T Magasu & Ors v Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur

(4)Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank v Jamaludin bin Mohd Jarjis

In my judgment, a person may be added as a party pursuant to O 15 r 6(2)(b)(i) or (ii), as expressly provided in the following words:

6 Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties (O 15 r 6)

(1)…

(2)At any stage of the proceedings in an