Gopal Sri Ram JCA (delivering judgment of the court):

This is the judgment of the court.

The appellant was convicted of an offence under s 304(a) of the Penal Code

Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the term of the imprisonment imposed on his client is manifestly excessive. The following points were canvassed in support of the appeal. First, that the High Court ought to have called for and considered the welfare report on the appellant. Second, that the judge ought to have taken into account the appellant’s age at the time of the commission of the offence.

In our judgment there is nothing in the first ground, because as pointed out by the learned deputy, the sentencing judge was very much alive to the calling for a welfare report because he drew attention of counsel to it. However, the counsel for the appellant in the court below said that such a report was unnecessary. As for the second ground said to constitute a mitigating factor one must not fail to have regard to the circumstances in which the killing took place.

There is no dispute that the appellant who was financially straitened planned to rob the deceased. It was he who enlisted the assistance of the other two accused to commit the crime. There is also no dispute that the deceased was savagely beaten then tied up and placed in a sack and thrown into a pond. In these circumstances we agree with the submission of the learned deputy that the killing of the deceased was most gruesome and demanded severe punishment. We are therefore, unpersuaded that the sentence is manifestly excessive in this case. But we are also of the view that given the circumstances alluded to the sentence was manifestly inadequate. We accordingly called upon counsel of the appellant to address us on why sentence should not be enhanced.

Learned counsel put forward two reasons why this court ought not to interfere. In the first place the appellant had pleaded guilty and saved the court’s time and expense to the public coffers. This, it was submitted was a considerable factor in mitigation. Secondly, it was submitted that the public prosecutor had found fit not to appeal in this case and this court therefore, not to exercise its powers under s 60(2) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964

Generally speaking, a plea of guilt is a strong mitigating circumstance operating in favour of an accused. However, there may be cases where the offence committed is so serious and the circumstances in which it was committed so heinous that a plea of guilt need be given little or no weight. The need to protect the public is another factor that may prevail over a plea of guilt. In this context we find it sufficient to refer to the decision of the Criminal Division of the English Court of Appeal in R v Costen (1989) 11 Cr App R (S) 182 at p 184 where Lord Lane LCJ said:

But there are certain exceptions, likewise well authenticated in the authorities, to that general rule that discount will be allowed for a plea of guilty. The first and most important exception is the protection of the public. Where it is necessary that a long sentence, if necessary the maximum sentence, should be passed in order to protect the public, in those circumstances a plea of guilty may not result in any discount.

An example of that is the case of Stabler (1984) 6 Cr App R (S) 129, to which we have been referred by Mr Gibbs. The appellant there pleaded guilty to three counts of indecently assaulting females and one of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The indecent assaults were all committed on the same day, on different victims. The assault occasioning actual bodily harm was committed on the victim of one of the indecent assaults, and almost simultaneously with it. The appellant had 28 previous convictions for similar offences. There was evidence that he was suffering from an untreatable personality disorder and might cause serious injury or death. There was no basis for admission to a hospital.

What Mr Justice Macpherson said in