Anantham Kasinather JCA (delivering judgment of the court):

BACKGROUND FACTS

[1]The appellant filed a claim against the respondent vide writ of summons dated 1 December 2011. The writ was served by post and the affidavit of service filed on 28 December 2011. Judgment in default of appearance was entered for the liquidated claim prayed for in the statement of claim on 29 December 2011.

[2]Following the entry of the default judgment, the appellant commenced garnishee proceedings and obtained an order to garnish monies of the respondent with its employer, Perbadanan Kemajuan Ekonomi Negeri Perlis. Incidentally, the judgment obtained by the appellant arose from a contract awarded by Perbadanan Kemajuan Ekonomi Negeri Perlis to the respondent with the appellant being the subcontractor of the respondent in respect of the same contract.

[3]The respondent did absolutely nothing upon the receipt of the writ of summons until the service of garnishee order on it. Following the receipt of the garnishee order, the respondent filed a summon in chambers dated 10 June 2012 seeking, inter alia, leave to file the summons out of time; leave to file an application pursuant to O 13 r 8 of the RHC 1980 and for the setting aside of the default judgment of 29 December 2011.

[4]Several affidavits were filed by both parties in support and in opposition to the summons in chambers of the respondent. The learned trial judge made an order setting aside the default judgment vide an order dated 29 August 2012. Neither the order of court of 29 August 2012 nor the grounds of decision of the learned trial judge makes any reference to the respondent’s prayers for extension of time or leave to file the application pursuant to O 13 r 8. His Lordship seems to have dealt solely with the prayer for the setting aside of the default judgment order.

DECISION OF THE COURT

[5]Under O 42 r 13 of the RHC 1980, every application to set aside a judgment must be filed and served on the party who has obtained the judgment within 30 days of the receipt of the order or judgment by the applicant. It is common ground that the application to set aside the default judgment was filed beyond the time prescribed by O 42 r 13 by a period in excess of five months. The only ground advanced by the respondent for the delay in filing the application outside the time limit is to be found in para 36 of the supporting affidavit. This paragraph reads as follow:

Saya menegaskan bahawa kelewatan tersebut adalah semata-mata atas alasan bahawa saya merasakan tuntutan tersebut adalah salah sama sekali dan tidak akan dilayan oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini tanpa menyedari bahawa saya terpaksa mempertikaikannya di Mahkamah terlebih dahulu sebelum ia di tolak oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini.

Additionally, in para 37 of the same affidavit, the respondent impliedly averred that he deemed it necessary to apply to set aside the default judgment only when the respondent’s interest in its project with Perbadanan Kemajuan Ekonomi Negeri Perlis was compromised.

[6]There is a plethora of authorities to the effect that O 42 r 13 is mandatory and that an applicant filing an application beyond the prescribed time limit is obliged to provide cogent reasons for any delay. We need cite only one authority in support of this proposition. This court in the case of Khor Cheng Wah v Sungai Way Leasing Sdn Bhd

It is a cardinal principle of law, that when a litigant seeks the intervention of the court in a matter that affects his rights, he must do so timeously. The maxim vigilantibus, non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, though having its origins in the Court of Chancery, is of universal application. Even in cases where a right is exercisable ex debito justitiae, a court may refuse relief to an indolent litigant.

In all cases in which delay in approaching the court is in issue, the burden is upon the litigant who has delayed to render a satisfactory explanation for it. Whether the explanation in a given case is satisfactory or reasonable depen