Syed Ahmad Helmy JCA:

[1]The appellants herein are the second, fourth and fifth defendants in the court below and the appeal pertains to the dismissal of the appellant’s application to set aside the judgment in default obtained against them on 1 July 2009.

[2]The suit was instituted against the appellants in their capacity as the former directors of the company known as Euro-Asian F & B Services (M) Sdn Bhd (‘the company’) which has since been wound up.

[3]The subject matter of the claim is for outstanding EPF contribution/payment between December 1992 and August 1993 together with dividend and interest and upon a certificate of non-appearance being recorded judgment in default was entered against the appellants on 1 July 2009.

[4]The appellant’s appeal was dismissed by the learned High Court judge. Hence this appeal.

[5]The issue for determination is the interpretation to be accorded to what is commonly referred to as a non-obstante clause appearing in ss 46(1)65(1)Employees Provident Fund (‘EPF Act’)Limitation Act

[6]The principal contention of the appellants was that the phraseology ‘notwithstanding the provisions of any other written law’ appearing in the non-obstante ss 46(1)65(1)EPF Act

[7]Before addressing the appellant’s contention aforesaid I would deal with the complaint that the judgment in default, by reason of the non-service of the writ, was irregularly obtained and hence should be set aside ex debitio justitiae. The appellant’s complaint is predicated by the AR cards which was returned by the post office without acknowledgment or signed by any recipient and does not bore the chop of the returning post office. The non-service of the writ and their absence of any knowledge of the proceedings was averred by the appellants in their supporting affidavits. In support of their complaint they referred to the Federal Court case of Tuan Haji Ahmed Abdul Rahman v Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd

It is elementary that an irregular judgment is one which has been entered otherwise than in strict compliance with the rules, some statute, or is entered as a result of some impropriety which is considered to be so serious as to render the proceedings nullity. The general rule is that when it is clearly demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that a judgment has not been regularly obtained, the defendant is entitled to have it set aside ex debitio justitiae, that is to say irrespective of the merits and without terms.

[8]The challenge by the appellants on the judgment in default being an irregular judgment as advanced by learned counsel is without merits. It is our considered view that the judgment in default recorded herein is a regular judgment. The respondent effected service of the writ of summons on the last known address of the appellants as discerned from their addresses found in Form 49

[9]There is no necessity for the respondent to prove receipt of the writ by the person named in the AR registered post. The Court of Appeal in Yap Ke Huat & Ors v Pembangunan Warisan Murni Sejahtera Sdn Bhd & Anor

There was no provision of law that the plaintiff must also prove that the person so named in the post had received the writ of summons and statement of claim. Once the writ of summons and statement of claim are sent by AR registered post, it is prima facie proof of service unless the defendant is able to rebut this. From the facts, that presumption was not rebutted.

[10]Similarly from the factual matrix the presumption of service herein was not rebutted. We may also add that there is no legal obligation imposed on the respondent to conduct a search at the National Registration Department to ascertain the latest address of the appellants.

[11]Having disposed of the challenge as to the irregularity of the default judgment I shall now proceed to address the issue as to the applicability of the Limitation Act in the light of the non-obstante clause of ss 46(1)65(1)EPF Act

[12]In the interpretation of statutory provisions, of utmost importance is t