Azahar Mohamed JCA (delivering judgment of the court):

[1]On 17 July 2012, Dato’ Seri Ahmad Zubair @ Ahmad Zubir bin Hj Murshid (‘the appellant’) was charged in the Sessions Court at Kuala Lumpur with two principal amended charges under s 409Penal Codes418

[2]Subsequently, before the commencement of the trial at the sessions court, the appellant took out a notice of motion dated 2 January 2013 at the Kuala Lumpur High Court seeking the following orders:

(a)the charges against the appellant under ss 409418PC

(b)the applicant to be acquitted and discharged from the charges;

(c)the proceeding of these two cases be suspended and/or stayed pending the disposal of this application; and

(d)any relief or direction or further order deemed fit and appropriate.

[3]On 15 March 2013 after hearing the notice of motion, the learned High Court judge dismissed it. Aggrieved by that decision, the appellant then appealed to this court. We heard his appeal, wherein at its conclusion we unanimously dismissed it. We now give our reasons for so deciding.

[4]There can be no doubt that the High Court has the inherent jurisdiction to set aside and quash a charge which is oppressive and an abuse of the process of the court (see: Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphrys Karpal Singh & Anor v Public Prosecutor Dato’ Seri Anwar bin Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor Karpal Singh & Anor v Public Prosecutor and Public Prosecutor v Ini Abong and other trials unwise is no basis for its exercise (see Archbold 2007: Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, p 358). A court has no general power to quash the charge and to decline to allow the trial to proceed where an indictment has been preferred in accordance with the law (see Director of Public Prosecutions v Humphrys).

[5]From these introductory general principles, we now turn to the issues raised in this appeal before us. First, we shall deal with the first and second principal amended charges against the appellant in relation to an offence of criminal breach of trust by an agent under s 409

[6]Datuk Mohd Yusof bin Zainal Abiden, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the amended criminal breach of trust charges were flawed, defective and tantamount to the appellant being charged for an offence unknown to the Code for the reasons that the charges did not specify the direction of law prescribing the manner in which the trust was to be discharged or of any legal contract made touching on the discharge of the trust.

[7]With respect, we are unable to agree with the contention of learned counsel for the appellant. In our view, the omission to state the mode in which the trust is to be discharged or of any legal contract made touching of the trust is not fatal at this stage of the proceedings. We agree with the submissions of Mr Kevin Morais, the learned deputy public prosecutor (‘DPP’) to the effect that the prosecution during the course of the trial can amend and lead evidence to identify the breach. In this regard, it is an established principle that with the leave of the court, the prosecution is entitled to amend the charges at any stage of the trial (see Heng You Nang v Public Prosecutor Public Prosecutor v Francis Dang anak Nuya Public Prosecutor v Tan Kim Kang & Ors s 173(h)(ii)Criminal Procedure CodePublic Prosecutor v Yeoh Teck Chye

[8]Furthermore, s 156CPCs 422CPC

[9]Learned counsel for the appellant also raised the following issues to support his contention that the principal amended charges against the appellant were groundless, mala fide and an abuse of the court process. First, the appellant was entrusted with the funds of Sime Darby Bhd to obtain NCR lands but the eventual payments were made from Sime Darby Plantations in which the appellant had no connection with the dominion of the funds. Secondly, the appellant was not responsible for the approval and eventual payments made by Sime Darby Plantations to purchase Vertical Drive Sdn Bhd and Nature Ambience Sdn Bhd. A