HAIDAR J

The plaintiff filed this action claiming, inter alia:

(1) A declaration that the right and title of Lok Chuan Yew (deceased) to Lots 1456, 1474, 1476, 1477 and 1478, all of Block 10, Kuching Central Land District, have been extinguished.

(2) A declaration that the plaintiff has become entitled to be registered as the proprietor of the six lots of land known as Lots 1456, 1474, 1476, 1477 and 1478, all of Block 10, Kuching Central Land District.

Thereafter the plaintiff filed a notice of motion, for an order that the Caveat No L 4671/1990 registered on 17 April 1990 against all those six parcels of land, namely, Lots 1456, 1474, 1476, 1477 and 1478, all of Block 10 Kuching Central Land District (‘the said land’) shall not be deemed to have lapsed until after the judgment in the action herein, notwithstanding the receipt on 14 June 1990 of a notice under s 178 of the Land Code (Cap 81)(‘the Land Code’) by the plaintiff/caveator from the Registrar, Land and Survey Department, Kuching Division, Kuching. It is supported by the affidavit of the plaintiff. The caveatable interest claimed by the plaintiff is on the ground of adverse possession of the said land. I heard the notice of motion on 5 September 1990 and delivered oral judgment on 8 September 1990 dismissing it with costs. There has been no appeal filed in respect of my judgment on the notice of motion.

By consent, the defendant was allowed extension of time to file the defence. Accordingly the defendant filed the statement of defence and counterclaim on 14 September 1990. Instead of filing the defence to the counterclaim of the defendant, the plaintiff filed an application by way of summons-in-chambers on 15 October 1990(encl 28) praying that the counterclaim be struck out with costs on the grounds that:

(a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action;

(b) it is frivolous and vexatious;

(c) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.

In addition thereto, the plaintiff urged the court to invoke the powers under its inherent jurisdiction, apparently under O 92 r 4 of the Rules of the High Court 1980(‘the RHC’). It is supported by the affidavit of the plaintiff.

On 31 October 1990 the defendant filed an application by way of summons-in-chambers under O 14 r 1 and O 18 r 19 of the RHC (encl 33). It is supported by the affidavit of Kang Min (f), the executrix of the estate of Lok Chuan Yew (deceased).

When both applications came before me for hearing on 31 January 1991 and after hearing both counsel, I directed that I will hear the defendant’s application first. At the hearing of the defendant’s application, Mr TO Thomas, counsel for the plaintiff, raised a preliminary objection. I agree with Mr TO Thomas that the defendant’s application purportedly under O 14 r 1 of the RHC, as the heading seems to indicate, is not supported by the grounds put forth therein. In the circumstances Mr TO Thomas submitted that the O 14 application should not be entertained by me. However, as regards the objection in respect of the O 18 application, though it is not substantially in Form 62 as required by O 32 r 1 of the RHC, I am of the view that the defendant did state the grounds as required by O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC in the application and there is therefore sufficient compliance with the provisions of the RHC. In the circumstances while agreeing with the objection raised by Mr TO Thomas in respect of the O 14 application I would, however, overrule his preliminary objection in respect of the application of the defendant under O 18 r 19(1) of the RHC. In the premises I will proceed to consider only the application under O 18 of the RHC.

Before proceeding to consider the merits of the defendant’s application under O 18 of the RHC it would not be inappropriate perhaps to consider first the issue of delay raised by Mr TO Thomas. It is not disputed that the defendant filed the application well after the defence and counterclaim was filed. While it may be true that in an O 14 application, it must