2000 MarsdenLR 488
SUPREME COURT (KUALA LUMPUR)
ABDUL MALEK AHMAD FCJ
CIVIL APPEAL NO 02-403 OF 1993
21 June 2000
Brijnandan Singh Bhar (Brijnandan Singh Bhar & Co) for the plaintiff.
Bala Mahesan (Bala Mahesan & Khairuddin) for the defendant.
Brijnandan Singh Bhar (Brijnandan Singh Bhar & Co) for the plaintiff.
Bala Mahesan (Bala Mahesan & Khairuddin) for the defendant.
Abdul Malek Ahmad FCJ:
JUDGMENT
By summons in chambers dated and filed on 9 October 1998, the appellant/ respondent, who was the plaintiff in the court below, had applied to the judge to review the learned registrar’s certificate under O. 59 r. 36 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 (hereinafter “the Rules”) as regards three items therein, namely item 46 at p. 8 where RM5,000 was awarded for getting up, interest on costs, and item 92 at p. 14 as regards attendance at the taxation proceedings to complete the bill of costs, to produce vouchers for disbursements and to obtain the learned registrar’s certificate, where the registrar had awarded RM50.
The appeal was set down for hearing before the Federal Court on 12 February 1992 but the appellant had withdrawn the appeal on that date in open court whereupon the appeal was dismissed with costs and the deposit refunded.
The taxation proceedings went before the registrar on 10 April 1998 where the costs awarded were RM7,124.82 including allocatur fees totaling RM533.32. The getting up costs applied were RM35,000 but only RM5,000 was awarded. The applicant/respondent had applied to the learned registrar to review her decision on the same items applied for here pursuant to O. 59 r. 34 of the Rules but this was dismissed on 2 October 1998.
On the getting up costs, the learned registrar stated her reasons for the decision as follows:
(a)the amount awarded was fair and reasonable taking into consideration that the appeal was in respect of a civil action for a road accident where the judgment was in the region of RM61,000;
(b)the appeal had been withdrawn and so there were no arguments in open court. However, the learned registrar took into account the fact that learned counsel had prepared the case;
(c)as for the RM5,000 awarded, the learned registrar had based her assessment pursuant to O. 59 r. 1(2) of the Rules. The learned registrar was of the view that the amount awarded was appropriate, fair and reasonable relying on the principles expounded in Weiltrade & Middle East Ltd & Anor. v. P.J. Wakelin & Ors
(d)she had also adhered to the principles and guidelines enunciated in Pang Kok v. Leong Fock Hap and Anor. [1997] 1 CLJ Supp 232 where it was said that for the purpose of taxation of costs, running down actions could be considered to be the simplest of cases;
(e)reliance was also placed on Property and Reversionary Investment Corporation v. Secretary of State for the Environment [1975] 2 All ER QBD 436 which held that the taxing master should ascertain the getting up costs based on complexity, skill, time, documents, place and circumstances, value, importance and other factors.
As for the attendance at the taxation proceedings to complete the bill of costs, to produce vouchers for disbursements and to obtain the learned registrar’s certificate, the learned registrar explained, when stating her reasons for the decision, that the minimum provided under item 37 of the scale of costs is RM30 and the maximum RM120 and accordingly, she considered RM50 to be fair, reasonable and appropriate.
In Coon v. Diamond Tread Co. (1938) Ltd. [1950] All ER vol. 2 385, on an inquiry as to damages, an official referee awarded the plaintiff a sum of 10,541 pounds Sterling, together with costs which he directed should be taxed. A bill of costs brought in by the plaintiff was reduced by the taxing master in respect of sums included in the bill in respect of the items “instructions for brief,” fees and refreshers to leading and junior counsel, and fees of accountants whose services the plaintiff had used at the inquiry. The plaintiff objected to the reductions on the grounds that the fees allowed were inadequate, and asked for the decision of the taxing master to be reviewed.
It was held that as the complaint went to quantum only, it had not been shown that the taxing master had erred on a question of principles and therefore the court had no jurisdiction to interfere with his decision.
At p. 387 of the judgment, Wy