1. Suit against Attorney General and Deputy Public Prosecutors for negligence, malicious prosecution, misfeasance in public office, and abuse of process regarding criminal prosecutions. (Para 3 )
2026 MarsdenLR 2456
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA)
RAVINTHRAN N PARAMAGURU, J, WONG KIAN KHEONG, J, NADZARIN WOK NORDIN, JJCA
Mohammad Najib bin Tun Haji Abdul Razak – Plaintiff
Versus
Thomas Thomas @ Mohan al K Thomas – Defendant
CIVIL APPEAL NO W-01(IM)(NCVC)-907-12 OF 2022
Important Points
Subject
Civil Law - Tort
Act Referred
Federal Constitution: Art.145(3)
Criminal Procedure Code: S.376(1)
Bankruptcy Act 1967: S.105
Insolvency Act 1967
Limitation Act 1953: S.6(1)(a)
Construction Industry Payment and Adjudications Act 2012: S.28
Headnote
(B) Natural Justice - Second Rule - Breach of natural justice - High Court not bound by submissions of parties - Judicial independence - No breach occurs when the court relies on an additional reason for a decision if parties were afforded the right to adduce evidence and submit on the main issue of the application (Paras 4-6).
(C) Tort of Negligence - Duty of care - The Attorney General and Public Prosecutor do not owe a duty of care to accused persons, complainants, or victims in respect of prosecutions instituted, conducted, or discontinued - The primary basis for exercising prosecutorial powers is public interest, which outweighs individual interests - Public policy considerations negate the existence of a duty of care to avoid simultaneous duplicity in criminal and civil proceedings, which could lead to unjust stays of criminal proceedings (Paras 7-11).
(D) Torts of Malicious Prosecution, Misfeasance in Public Office, and Abuse of Process - Prerequisites for filing suit - A suit for malicious prosecution requires the plaintiff to prove final acquittal as one of the five essential elements - A suit for misfeasance in public office or abuse of process regarding prosecutorial powers can only be filed after the prosecution has finally ended in favor of the plaintiff to ensure damages have crystallized and to avoid duplicity of proceedings - Such suits are premature if filed before final acquittal (Paras 12-26). (E) Tort of Malicious Process - Recognition of new torts - A tort of malicious process should not be recognized against the exercise of prosecutorial powers by the Attorney General and Public Prosecutor - The tort of malicious prosecution provides a just, effective, and adequate remedy for accused persons who are ultimately acquitted (Paras 27-30).
Facts of the case:
An appellant filed a suit against the Attorney General and others alleging negligence, misfeasance in public office, and abuse of process following the institution of multiple criminal charges. The High Court struck out the suit. The appellant appealed, contending that the High Court breached the second rule of natural justice by relying on reasons not submitted by counsel and that the claims in tort were maintainable.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the Attorney General and Public Prosecutor do not owe a duty of care to accused persons regarding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The claims based on malicious prosecution, misfeasance in public office, and abuse of process were premature as the appellant had not been finally acquitted of the charges at the time of filing. The court further declined to recognize a new tort of malicious process in the context of prosecutorial powers.
Issues: (1) Whether the High Court breached the second rule of natural justice by providing an additional reason for striking out the suit that was not submitted by counsel; (2) Whether the Attorney General and Public Prosecutor owe a duty of care to accused persons, complainants, or victims regarding prosecutions; (3) Whether suits for malicious prosecution, misfeasance in public office, and abuse of process can be filed before final acquittal; (4) Whether the courts should recognize a tort of "malicious process" against prosecutorial authorities.
Ratio Decidendi: The exercise of prosecutorial powers is governed by public interest, which outweighs individual interests, and public policy prevents a duty of care in negligence to avoid the duplicity of simultaneous proceedings. For torts such as malicious prosecution and misfeasance in public office, the cause of action only matures upon final acquittal, as the loss must crystallize. Since malicious prosecution is already an adequate remedy for the misuse of prosecutorial powers, there is no necessity to recognize a separate tort of malicious process.
Result: Appeal dismissed with costs.
Legal Category Hierarchy
-
tort
-
negligence
- duty of care
- malicious prosecution
- misfeasance in public office
- abuse of process
- malicious process
-
negligence
-
practice and procedure
- striking out
- natural justice
-
constitutional law
- prosecutorial powers
Firoz Hussein bin Ahmad Jamaluddin (with Yudistra Darma Dorai, Melody Tham Cheng Yee, Daniel Annamalai, Woo J Enn, Harel Niryan and Dheveendra Krishna Kumar) (Raj, Ong & Yudistra) for the appellant.
Alan Adrian Gomez (with Mervyn Lai Wei Shiung and Haikaldin Mahyidin) (Tommy Thomas) for the respondent.
Table of Contents
2. Appeal dismissed with costs. (Para 1 )
Wong Kian Kheong JCA:
SUPPORTING JUDGMENT
A. Introduction
[1]We have dismissed the above appeal (This Appeal) with costs of RM12,000.00 (subject to allocatur fee) (Our Decision).
[2]My learned brother, Ravinthran a/l Paramaguru JCA, has previously forwarded to me a copy of his draft written judgment regarding Our Decision (Draft Judgment). I concur with the Draft Judgment and wish to add further reasons in support of Our Decision (This Judgment). A draft of This Judgment had been forwarded to my learned brothers, Ravinthran a/l Paramaguru and Nadzarin bin Wok Nordin JJCA. Both my learned brothers had expressed their agreement with This Judgment.
B. Issues
[3]The following questions will be discussed in This Judgment:
(1)is there a breach of the second rule of natural justice (2nd Rule) when the learned High Court Judge in this suit (This Suit), gave a reason for the decision to strike out This Suit (High Court’s Decision) which had not been submitted on by both learned counsel in This Suit?;
(2)with regard to the tort of negligence, whether -
(a)the Attorney General (AG) cum Public Prosecutor (PP) (referred collectively in This Judgment as the “AG/PP”); and
(b)Deputy Public Prosecutors (DPPs)
(c)owe a duty of care to accused person(s), complainant(s) and/or victim(s) [Accused Person(s)/Complainant(s)/Victim(s)] in respect of prosecutions which have been instituted, conducted and/or discontinued by the AG/PP and DPPs with regard to the Accused Person(s)/Complainant(s)/Victim(s) [Prosecution(s)];
(3)can accused person(s) file a suit against the AG/PP and DPPs for the following three torts (3 Torts) in respect of the Prosecution(s) -
(a)tort of malicious prosecution;
(b)tort of misfeasance in public office; and
(c)tort of abuse of process?; and
(4)whether our courts should recognise a new tort of “malicious process” against the AG/PP and DPPs when the AG/PP and DPPs may be liable for the tort of malicious prosecution.
C. Was there a breach of the 2nd Rule by the learned High Court Judge?
[4]The learned High Court Judge stated in paragraphs 56 to 69 of his “Grounds of Judgment”, an additional reason for the High Court’s Decision (Additional Reason), namely, there is a “built in check and balance” mechanism in this country wherein the respondent in This Appeal (Respondent), as the then AG/PP, could not have committed the following three torts against the appellant in This Appeal (Appellant):
(1)the tort of malicious process;
(2)the tort of misfeasance in public office; and
(3)the tort of negligence.
[5]According to the Appellant’s learned counsel, the 2nd Rule had been breached by the learned High Court Judge because -
(1)both learned counsel did not submit on the Additional Reason in the High Court with regard to the Respondent’s application to strike out This Suit (Respondent’s Striking Out Application); and
(2)if the High Court had intended to rely on the Additional Reason to decide on the Respondent’s Striking Out Application, the 2nd Rule required the learned High Court Judge to pose the Additional Reason to both learned counsel before the High Court’s Decision was made and this would have enabled learned counsel to submit to the High Court on the Additional Reason.
[6]I am not able to accept the above contention that there was a breach of the 2nd Rule when the High Court’s Decision was made without affording both learned counsel a right to submit on the Additional Reason. The following reasons support this decision:
(1)the 2nd Rule only requires all parties in court proceedings to be given a right to adduce evidence and to submit on all the issues which arise in the proceedings - please refer to the Court of Appeal’s judgment in SKN Land & Development Sdn Bhd v Crest Worldwide Resources Sdn Bhd & Ors (in liquidation) (Mudajaya Corp Bhd & Ors, interveners) and another appeal
(2)The main issue in the Respondent’s Striking Out Application (Main Issue) was whether the High Court should exercise its discretion to strike out This Suit under O 18 r 19(1)(a)