JUDGMENT

Raja Segaran S Krishnan JC:

A. Introduction

[1] This is a husband's petition for a decree of nullity under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 ("the Act"). The petition is brought on the footing that the marriage, though validly registered, is voidable because it has not been consummated owing to the wilful refusal of the respondent to consummate it within the meaning of s 70(b).

[2] The proceedings are formally uncontested. The respondent filed affidavits stating that she understood the petition and supporting affidavit, had received them on 3 March 2026, and had no objection to the orders sought. That procedural posture, however, does not conclude the matter. A decree of nullity is not granted by agreement. It is granted only if the Court is satisfied that the statutory ground has been proved.

[3] The real controversy is narrow but decisive. The issue is not whether this marriage has failed in a practical sense. Nor is it whether both parties now wish to be rid of it. The issue is whether the petitioner has proved that the admitted non-consummation was caused by the respondent's wilful refusal within s 70(b).

[4] That issue matters because the Act draws a deliberate distinction between nullity and divorce. Nullity addresses marriages that are void or voidable on specified statutory grounds. Divorce addresses breakdown. If s 70(b) were treated as extending to any short, unhappy or unconsummated marriage, the legislative boundary between the two regimes would be obscured.

[5] This case is also significant for a further reason. The authorities placed before the Court include Re: Kirthiga Suthan Kathiravellu & Anor; [2023] 12 MLJ 265, which appears to be the principal Malaysian decision dealing directly with s 70 in this context. That decision is useful and important, but it does not exhaust the questions that arise where, unlike there, the petition is brought by one spouse against another and supported by affidavits that speak in general conclusions but not in primary facts. This case therefore requires careful attention to the statutory text, the structure of the Act, the existing Malaysian authority, and the persuasive authorities available through s 47, so that the proper approach to future applications under s 70(b) may be stated with clarity.

B. Material Facts And Procedural History

[6] The petitioner, NG KOK YUAN, and the respondent, DUONG THI NGOC DIEM, registered their marriage on 22 May 2025 at the National Registration Department, Petaling, Selangor. The marriage certificate exhibited to the petition records the date, district and state of registration accordingly.

[7] The petition states that both parties reside in Malaysia. The petitioner's address is stated as No 5, Jalan Permas 6/20, Bandar Baru Permas Jaya, 81750 Masai, Johor. The respondent's address is stated as No 6, Jalan Permas 6/20, Bandar Baru Permas Jaya, 81750 Masai, Johor. The supporting affidavit and the respondent's affidavits repeat those addresses.

[8] The petition further states that no child was born of the marriage, that there is no matrimonial property arising from the marriage, and that there were no earlier proceedings in Malaysia or elsewhere touching the marriage or any property of either or both parties.

[9] The material allegation is that the marriage was never consummated and that this was because the respondent deliberately refused to consummate it. The petition then adds several brief factual matters: after registration the parties lived in their respective homes; quarrels frequently occurred; the respondent was often at variance with the petitioner; there was no mutual understanding between them; and around January 2026, after a quarrel, the petitioner stated that he no longer intended to continue with the marriage.

[10] On 26 February 2026, the petitioner affirmed his supporting affidavit. That affidavit did not narrate fresh facts. It simply verified that the statements in paras 1 to 10 of the petition were true and identi