2026 MarsdenLR 1362
HIGH COURT MALAYA GEORGETOWN
CHOONG YEOW CHOY, J
CHNG CHEN MONG & ORS – Appellant
Versus
MG FURNITURE SDN BHD & ORS – Respondent
[Civil Suit No: PA-22NCvC-111-07/2024]
Legal professional privilege, including joint privilege, is a substantive right that cannot be unilaterally waived. Disqualification of counsel is an exceptional remedy reserved for cases with compelling evidence of a real risk to the administration of justice; mere tactical allegations of conflict are insufficient.
Headnote:(A) Evidence Act, 1950 - Section 126(1) - Rules of Court 2012 - Order 32 and Order 41 Rule 6 - Solicitor-client privilege and litigation privilege - Joint privilege - Waiver of privilege - Disqualification of solicitors - Application to expunge affidavits for privilege - Alleged abuse of process - Criteria for restraining counsel of choice. (Paras 33, 43, 49, 53, 54, 56, 86)
(B) Privilege - Solicitor-client and litigation privilege - Dominant purpose test - Privilege is absolute until waived by the privilege holder - Waiver requires clear or unequivocal conduct - Joint privilege held by corporate entities and officers cannot be unilaterally waived by an individual - Confidentiality breach does not extinguish substantive privilege. (Paras 33, 35, 54, 55, 57)
(C) Disqualification of Counsel - Threshold for disqualification is high - Exceptional jurisdiction exercised only where there is real risk to administration of justice or material conflict - Advocate as witness rule - Merely acting on instructions for multiple parties with common interest does not constitute conflict. (Paras 62, 65, 87, 88)
Facts of the case:
The litigation involved several interlocutory applications, including a request to disqualify a law firm from representing multiple defendants and a request to expunge certain affidavits and communications from the record. The claimants argued that communications between the solicitors and defendants should be protected by privilege, while the opposing party contested the status of these documents and alleged that the solicitors should be disqualified due to conflict of interest and the 'advocate as witness' rule.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the communications in question were exchanged under a joint retainer and served the purpose of obtaining or providing legal advice during ongoing litigation. The court maintained that such privilege is jointly held and cannot be waived by a single party. Furthermore, the court held that there was no evidence of actual or perceived conflict necessitating the removal of the solicitors and that disqualification at a late stage would cause significant prejudice to the administration of justice.
Issues: The main issues were whether specific communications and affidavits were protected by legal professional privilege (solicitor-client and litigation privilege), whether such privilege was jointly held, and whether the law firm should be disqualified for conflict of interest.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that privilege is a substantive right that is not easily waived and that the 'dominant purpose' test was satisfied. It held that the court has an inherent jurisdiction to protect the integrity of privileged material. Furthermore, it affirmed that a party's right to choose counsel is paramount unless a real risk to the administration of justice is substantiated by compelling evidence, which was absent here.
Result: Applications dismissed.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. court's context and jurisdictional overview regarding interlocutory applications. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8) |
| 2. standard for procedural preliminary objections and the functionality of reply affidavits. (Para 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29) |
| 3. requirements for solicitor-client, litigation, and joint privilege. (Para 30 , 31 , 32 , 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 , 50 , 51 , 52 , 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59) |
| 4. high threshold for solicitor disqualification based on conflict of interest. (Para 60 , 61 , 62 , 63 , 64 , 65 , 66 , 67 , 68 , 69 , 70 , 71 , 72 , 73 , 74 , 75 , 76 , 77 , 78 , 79 , 80 , 81 , 82 , 83 , 84 , 85 , 86 , 87 , 88 , 89 , 90 , 91 , 92 , 93) |
| 5. allocation of costs following the disposal of applications. (Para 94 , 95 , 96) |
JUDGMENT
Introduction
[1] The present Notices of Application beofre this Court are encl 392 and encl 435.
[2] Enclosure 392 is an application by the Plaintiffs in the main action, who are also the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Defendant in the Counterclaim, seeking an order that Messrs Lee Hishammuddin Allen & Gledhill ("LHAG") be disqualified or recused from acting ofr the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 8th, 10th and 11th Defendant in the main action ("the Disqualification Application").
[3] Enclosure 435, on the other hand, is an application by the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 8th, 10th and 11th Defendant in the main action, seeking an order that the affidavits affirmed by the 7th Defendant in encls 343 and 376 be expunged from the record ("the Expungement Application").
[4] These applications arise in proceedings that have, by any measure, been marked by an extraordinary degree of interlocutory activity. As of 29 January 2026, 532 cause papers have been filed in this action, and 17 interlocutory applications have already been heard and disposed of by this Court.
[5] By encl 533 dated 6 February 2026, this Court was further inofrmed that a fresh action, Civil Suit No: PA-22NCvC-12- 01/2026 ("Suit 12"), titled MG Furniture Sdn Bhd v. Ch'ng Chen Mong & 8 Others, was commenced in January 2026. It was also placed on record that the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 8th, 10th and 11th Defendant in the main action have objected to the inclusion and reliance on a Chronology of Events contained in the written submissions filed in Suit 12 [Enclosure 38 in Suit 12].
[6] This Court observes that the present Enclosures are but two of a long series of interlocutory applications filed by the parties. These applications must, of course, be taken as having been filed on instructions, with counsel discharging their duties as officers of the Court.
[7] That said, encls 392 and 435 cannot be treated as merely further procedural incidents in an already protracted course of litigation. They raise issues which go to fundamental and well- established principles of civil justice, namely, the protection of legal professional privilege and the right of a litigant to be represented by counsel of its choice, subject always to recognised and limited exceptions.
[8] It is precisely because these principles are of such importance that this Court has considered the submissions of all parties, and the authorities cited, with particular care and circumspection, notwithstanding the volume of proceedings and the history of extensive interlocutory engagement.
The Preliminary Objection
[9] This Court shall begin with an analysis of the preliminary objection raised by the plaintiffs in encl 488, that is, the plaintiffs' preliminary objection to encls 469-470.
[10] The deponent in encl 469 is the 10th Defendant in the main action. She is also the Chief Corporate Officer of HHRG Berhad, the 3rd Defendant in the main action and also the Chairman and Director of the 1st Defendant in the main action.
Summary Of The plaintiffs' Preliminary Objection
[11] In essence, the plaintiffs' preliminary objection rests on a narrow but fundamental proced