2026 MarsdenLR 1188
HIGH COURT SABAH & SARAWAK TAWAU
STEVE RITIKOS, JC
RONEY SAIMEY SAKAH – Appellant
Versus
PP – Respondent
[Criminal Appeal No: TWU-42R(A)-3-7/2024]
JUDGMENT
Introduction
[1] The Appellant was charged under s 17(a) of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2009 ("MACC Act"). The charge reads as follows:
Bahawa kamu pada 7 April 2017 jam lebih kurang 11.00am, bertempat di Pejabat Cawangan Trafik, Ibu Pejabat Polis Daerah Lahad Datu, di dalam Daerah Lahad Datu, di dalam Negeri Sabah, sebagai ejen Kerajaan Malaysia, iaitu Inspektor yang bertugas di Cawangan Trafik Daerah Lahad Datu telah secara rasuah memperoleh suatu suapan untuk diri kamu, iaitu wang tunai RM3,500.00 daripada Rostam bin Arsad (No.KPT: 86072212 5105) sebagai dorongan untuk melakukan suatu perbuatan berhubung dengan urusan hal ehwal prinsipal kamu, iaitu menyelesaikan kes kemalangan yang disiasat di bawah s 41 Akta Pengangkutan Jalan 1987 dan tiada pertuduhan di mahkamah dibuat bagi kesalahan tersebut dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan di bawah s 17(a) Akta Suruhanjaya Pencegahan Rasuah Malaysia 2009 yang boleh dihukum di bawah s 24(1) Akta yang sama.
Background
[2] The appellant was found guilty and convicted of the charge and sentenced to an imprisonment term of 1 year and to a fine of RM18,000.00 in default 3 months' imprisonment. A stay of execution pending appeal was granted. The present appeal is against conviction and sentence. However, learned counsel for the Appellant had in his submission made it clear that the Appellant abandoned the appeal against sentence in the event the conviction is maintained, and prayed that the sentence passed by the learned Sessions Court Judge be maintained.
Principles Of Law In appeals
[3] As a matter of principle, an appellate Court will not intervene with a decision of a trial Court with whom the law entrusts the primary task of evaluating the evidence. The appellate Court would only intervene if it is convinced that there was no judicial appreciation by the trier of fact of the evidence adduced at the trial and that the trial Court was shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision (see UEM Group Bhd v. Genisys Integrated Engineers Pte Ltd & Anor;[2018] MLJ (Supp) 363; [2010] 9 CLJ 785; Hamit Matusin & Ors v. Penguasa Tanah dan Survei & Anor and Another Appeal; [2006] 3 MLJ 289; [2006] 2 CLJ 251; [2006] 3 AMR 369; PP v. Ahmad Firdaus Zulkifli; [2017] 3 MLJ 492).
[4] In Davendar Singh Sher Singh v. PP; [2012] 3 AMR 489, Azahar Mohammed, JCA (as he then was) had this to say on appellate intervention:
"[9]... Nonetheless, it would be open to us to upset the findings made by a trial judge if such a finding is not supported by evidence or the decision is against the weight of the evidence or there is no proper judicial evaluation of the evidence or there is misdirection in law or the trial Court has fundamentally misdirected itself. In this regard, judicial appreciation and evaluation of evidence is at the heart of the duty of the learned trial judge. It is the duty of the learned trial judge to undertake a positive evaluation of the evidence, which includes a careful analysis of the credibility and reliability of the witnesses for the prosecution (see: Balachandran v. PP; [2005] 2 MLJ 301; [2005] 1 CLJ 85; [2005] 1 AMR 321). It is also his duty to consider the entire evidence presented before him, including the evidence which favours the defence. On what constitutes judicial appreciation of evidence, it is apt to bear in mind the following words of Gopal Sri Ram JCA (as he then was) in Lee Ing Chin & Ors v. Gan Yook Chin & Anor; [2003] 2 MLJ 97; [2003] 2 CLJ 19; [2003] 2 AMR 357:
"A judge who is required to adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. He must, when deciding whether to accept or to reject the evidence of a witness, test it against relevant criteria. Thus, he must take into account the presence or absence of any motive that a witness may have in giv