JUDGMENTBY: WILLAN, CJ

In this case the prosecution filed two charges against the appellant, first being in possession of a .32 Colt revolver, and secondly with being in possession of 34 rounds of .32 revolver ammunition, 1 round of .303 rifle ammunition and a hand-grenade.

After the two Assessors had been chosen the trial Judge decided it was undesirable that the two charges should be tried together at one trial, and thereupon the prosecution elected to proceed on the second charge only -- i.e. the charge relating to the ammunition and the hand-grenade.

The appellant, on being called upon to plead to that charge, claimed trial.

The sequence of events at the opening of the trial is not in accordance with the provisions of section 186 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which lays down that the plea of an accused person must be taken before the Assessors are chosen. The reason for this, of course, is that if an accused person pleads guilty and his plea is accepted, there is no need to proceed to choose any Assessors.

The evidence against the appellant on the second charge was that he was found standing at the entrance to a house in a clearing in the jungle carrying a small cloth bag. In that bag were found 28 rounds of revolver ammunition and one round of .303 ammunition. Inside the house, lying on a table, were found a revolver (the subject matter of the first charge not proceeded with at the trial), 6 rounds of revolver ammunition and a hand-grenade. These 6 rounds of ammunition and the hand-grenade found on the table were lumped together with the ammunition found on the appellant in the cloth bag and form the total of the articles incorporated in the second charge.

Both Assessors found the appellant guilty on the second charge. The learned trial Judge agreed with them and, having recorded a conviction, sentenced the appellant to death. Therefore the appellant stands convicted of being in possession of 34 rounds of revolver ammunition, one round of .303 rifle ammunition and a hand-grenade.

A significant fact, proved by the prosecution, in relation to the revolver, the 6 rounds of ammunition and the hand-grenade found on the table is that, when the police raided the house, another person was seen to run away from it and he was not arrested. This is important because it raises the question as to whether the evidence at the trial proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was in exclusive possession of those 6 rounds of ammunition and the hand-grenade.

At the trial the prosecution led evidence as to those 6 rounds of ammunition and the hand-grenade found lying on the table. They also led evidence as to the revolver, which was put in as an exhibit at the trial, though the second charge (the only charge proceeded with at the trial) does not relate to possession of a revolver.

Mr. Mills, for the appellant, submitted that this evidence regarding the revolver was inadmissible, and that having been admitted it must have prejudiced the Assessors against the appellant and thereby he was not afforded a fair trial. He said this must be specially so because the Assessors themselves had been chosen before the appellants plea was taken; they therefore heard the ruling by the Judge that only the second charge should be proceeded with; and consequently they knew from the beginning of the trial that there was another charge in existence against the appellant charging him with being in possession of a revolver.

Mr. Austin, Federal Counsel, argued that the evidence relating to the revolver was admissible by section 7 of the Evidence Enactment (Cap. 10) which reads:--

Facts which are the occasion, cause or effect, immediate or otherwise,

of relevant facts, or facts in issue, or which constitute the state of

things under which they happened, or which afforded an opportunity for

their occurrence or transaction, are relevant.

The fact in issue in this case was whether the appellant was or was not in possession of