JUDGMENTBY: THOMSON CJ, RIGBY J, HEPWORTH J

THOMSON CJ The appellant in this appeal is the administratrix of the estate of one Gooi Kim Kwan who was killed in a motor accident near Sungei Siput on 21st March, 1956. The respondent is the administrator of the estate of one Loke Ta Poh who was killed in the same accident.

Gooi was a passenger in a motor-car which was being driven by Loke when it came into collision with a motor lorry and as a result of the collision both men were killed.

It was alleged by the appellant that the accident was entirely due to the negligence of Loke and she accordingly sued for damages under the provisions of the Civil Law Ordinance, 1956. By reason of section 8 of the Ordinance the proceedings were brought against the administrator of Lokes estate.

Letters of Administration to Lokes estate, although granted to the respondent on 4th November, 1956, were not extracted until 8th August, 1957, and the appellants plaint was not filed until 17th February, 1958. These proceedings were accordingly taken after the expiration of the period of six months prescribed by section 8(3)(b) of the Civil Law Ordinance which reads as follows:--

"No proceedings shall be maintainable in respect of a cause of action

in tort which by virtue of this section has survived against the estate

of a deceased person, unless proceedings against him in respect of that

cause of action ...

...

(b) are taken not later than six months after his personal

representative took out representation."

In his defence the respondent in addition to denying negligence pleaded that the action was barred by the provision of the Civil Law Ordinance which has been quoted, and in the event he took out a summons to have the point decided as a preliminary point under Order 45 rule 2. At the same time the appellant applied to the Court for an order that the time prescribed by the section be enlarged. Both applications came on for hearing before Mr. Justice Barakhah who held that the Court had no power to enlarge the period of time prescribed by the Ordinance and held that the appellants alleged cause of action was barred by it.

Against that decision the appellant has now appealed.

The terms of section 8(3)(b) of the Civil Law Ordinance are clear. The section states that no proceedings of the present nature against the estate of a deceased person shall be maintainable unless they are taken not later than six months after the personal representative takes out administration. The Ordinance itself contains no provision of any sort giving the Court power to extend that period.

The case for the appellant, however, was based on section 47 of the Courts Ordinance which reads as follows:--

"The original civil jurisdiction of the High Court shall be as set out

in the Second Schedule hereto."

and item 12 of the Second Schedule which reads as follows:--

"Jurisdiction to enlarge or abridge the time prescribed by any written

law for doing any act or taking any proceeding, although any

application therefor be not made until after the expiration of the time

prescribed."

It was argued that these provisions give the High Court power to enlarge or abridge any period of time prescribed by any written law for doing any act or taking any proceedings and in particular that they give the Court power to extend the period prescribed by the Civil Law Ordinance. It is, incidentally, a somewhat curious corollary to this argument that the Court has equally the power to abridge that time and so debar from his remedy a plaintiff who has commenced proceedings in this Court within the statutory period of six months.

The learned trial Judge stated his opinion on the point in the following words:--

"Item 12, my opinion, merely sets out the jurisdiction of the High

Court, namely, the scope of authority to deal with certain matters

expressly provided for by the law, and the Court could enlarge