JUDGMENTBY: THOMSON CJ, HILL AND BARAKBAH JJA

THOMSON CJ (delivering oral judgment): This appellant claims to be the natural son of a man called Ng Seng Kee who died intestate on 24th May, 1944, leaving two widows and the appellant and as such entitled to participate in the succession to his fathers estate.

His mother who is the administratrix of the estate and the respondent to this appeal claims that he is not a natural son but an adopted son.

Mr. Justice Suffian heard the case and came to the conclusion that the appellant was an adopted son. Against that decision the appellant has now appealed.

Apart from documents, to which I shall come in a moment, there was a great deal of parol evidence which was virtually uncontradicted by other parol evidence to the effect that the appellant was an adopted son. In the first place there was the evidence of his alleged mother, the respondent, who after all is the person best qualified to know as to whether he was a natural son or not and there was the evidence of a woman, Lim Kwai, who said she had acted as go-between in arranging for the adoption of the appellant. According to her he was the natural son of two people called Lee Hai and Ng Ho Nio. Such was the parol evidence.

In addition there was a quantity of documentary evidence some of which supported the appellant, some of which (the admissibility of which has been challenged) was against him.

There was a birth certificate showing him to be a natural son. There was a travel document showing him to be a natural son. But of course it is well known that it is a common practice among the Chinese community to treat adopted sons in every way as natural sons and the fact that the appellant was so treated as regards registration of his birth and as regards travel documents does not take the case very far.

Then there was a so-called document of adoption that the respondent said was found among some papers of her deceased mother. That purports to be a document executed by the natural father and mother of the appellant making him over as an adopted child to the respondent and rather curiously on the face of it it bears the date of the 8th day of the 8th moon of the 28th year of the Chinese Republic (20th September, 1939) which curiously is the first birthday (by Chinese reckoning) of the child according to the document itself and which is the same date as appears on the birth certificate which has been extracted from the Register of Births and Deaths, Pahang. That document bears the signature as attesting witness of the woman, Lim Kwai who was called and swore to it and who also swore of her own recollection of the circumstances of the adoption. This document, it has been argued, was wrongfully admitted.

Now, in the first place if this point was to be taken at all it should have been taken at the trial. It is too late to take it now. And in the second place it is a bad point because the document is clearly admissible if only to corroborate the oral evidence of the woman who signed as a witness, that is Lim Kwai. At the very lowest it is admissible by reason of sections 159 and 160 of the Evidence Ordinance to refresh her memory.

Again it has been said that certain bits and pieces of parol evidence should not have been admitted as they were hearsay. Again the point was not taken at the trial and in my view not only is it too late to take it now but it is a bad point for the evidence was not hearsay.

Finally it is said that the Judge looked at the respondents petition for letters of administration which omitted all reference to the appellant as one of the next-of-kin. It is said that he should not have done so because that document was not produced in evidence by either party. Again, the point was not taken at the trial although at the trial the Judge made it very clear he was going to look at that document. Again it is too late to take the point now. I would, however, observe that my own view is that the point is of little importa