JUDGMENT

Sharma J:

The principal claim of the plaintiff in this suit is for an injunction and a declaration. The facts are not very much in dispute. The plaintiff is the tenant of the ground floor of premises No. 139 Jalan Bunga Raya of which the defendant is the landlord and the owner. The defendant occupies the first floor of the same premises. The plaintiff, throughout the period of her tenancy, has had use of water, the kitchen, the bathroom and the toilet on the ground floor. On or about the 7 March 1970 the defendant cut off the water supply to the plaintiff by locking up the water tap. The result of this was obvious. The plaintiff from that moment onwards was forced to get her supplies of water from elsewhere and it was fortunate for her that she was able to do so from the house next door, i.e. premises No. 137 Jalan Bunga Raya. On 4 April 1970 the defendant demolished the bathroom and on 31 May 1970 constructed a door on the ground floor whereby she cut off the rear portion of the ground door from the portion in the physical occupation of the plaintiff. The defendant locked this door which meant that the plaintiff and all the members of her family were deprived of the use of the bathroom, the kitchen and the toilet. These basic facts are not denied by the defendant. Various affidavits have been filed in support and in opposition to the motion. The defendant has tried to explain in those affidavits the reasons for her conduct and she has alleged that there were various acts of annoyance on the part of the plaintiff or her children which alone induced her to do what she had ultimately done. I may pause here and say that all those acts of annoyance or even threats to the safety and life of the defendant are not really very material for the purposes of determination of the real question involved in this application. The defendant should have sought proper redress in respect of those acts attributed to the plaintiff and which she now complains of and which she says can excuse her own conduct. If a wrong had been done by the plaintiff it did not thereby follow that another wrong done by the defendant was justifiable on that ground.

The defendant's own husband, who was cross-examined by the plaintiff's Counsel on the affidavit affirmed by him on 14 October 1970, very candidly and truthfully told the Court that he in fact did advise her not to do what she had done but his wife seemed to have reasons of her own to pursue her intentions to their fulfilment. The plaintiff being a tenant of the defendant it must follow that a covenant for quiet enjoyment was implied in her tenancy. The plaintiff has had the right to the use of water and the facilities of the kitchen, the bathroom and the toilet all these years and the continued and undisputed use of those facilities formed part of her right to quiet enjoyment of the premises. Where the quiet enjoyment of the premises by the tenant is interrupted by the act of the landlord, the tenant is entitled to come to Court and seek an injunction. I have been told and the Counsel for both parties agree that the premises in question are rent controlled premises. A notice to quit has been served upon the plaintiff but that does not alter the situation. The plaintiff on the expiry of the notice became the statutory tenant of the defendant and she as a statutory tenant is equally entitled, to the benefit of the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment. Lavender v. Betts [1942] 167 LT 70 was a case in which the windows and doors were removed by the landlord in an attempt to persuade the tenant to vacate and it was held that this was a breach by the landlord of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. Cutting off the water supply was undoubtedly an act on the part of the defendant whereby she as the landlord became in breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. There may be instances when there is just or sufficient cause for breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment as, for example, when some necessary repai