JUDGMENT

Suffian LP (read by Ali FJ):

In this appeal we are only concerned with procedure.

The plaintiffs (respondents before us) are the daughters of the late Tan Sri Khaw Kai Boh (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") by his first wife. The first defendant (first appellant) was the second wife of the deceased and the sole executrix and beneficiary under his will. She is the beneficial owner of all the issued shares in the second defendant other than the plaintiffs' 500 shares. The second defendant (second appellant) is a private limited company, of which the first defendant is also a director.

On 31 March 1973, the plaintiffs commenced an action against the two defendants by way of a specially indorsed writ accompanied by a concise statement of claim praying for -

(1) a declaration that two purported transfers dated 20 September 1968, of shares in the defendant company to their late father were void;

(2) rectification of the second defendant company's register of members by striking out from it the deceased's name and by inserting the names of the plaintiffs as holders of those share;

(3) alternatively, as against the first defendant a declaration -

(a) that she holds the said shares in trust for them; and

(b) that an order that the first defendant transfer the same to them;

(4) a declaration that the second plaintiff is a director of the company; and

(5) for necessary accounts and inquiries.

On the same day the plaintiffs filed a separate statement of claim. They alleged that the purported transfers were made without consideration and therefore void; alternatively, they relied on s. 168 of the Contracts (Malay States) Ordinance, 1950, and s. 103(1) of the Companies Act, 1965; and finally they relied on the doctrine of resulting trust. The defendants entered conditional appearance on 5 April 1973. The statement of defence has yet to be filed.

On 24 April 1973, the plaintiffs, by summons in chambers applied for an order that the writ be converted into a generally indorsed writ by striking out the words "specially indorsed" appearing in its heading and that the statement of claim therein be treated as a statement of claim under a generally indorsed writ; that the name of the defendant company be changed to its correct name, i.e., "Wonli Investment Company Sdn. Bhd"; and that the costs of the application and the amendments be paid by them (the plaintiffs).

On the same day the defendants applied to set aside the writ and all subsequent proceedings for irregularity on the grounds that the proceedings have been improperly issued, are defective in form and do not comply with the Rules of the Supreme Court, in particular O. 53B, r. 6; that the specially indorsed writ has been improperly issued; and that there has been improper joinder of causes of action.

Both applications were considered together in chambers. The learned Judge dismissed the defendants' and allowed the plaintiff's application, thus making an order directing that the specially indorsed writ be converted to a generally indorsed writ, that the statement of claim be treated as a statement of claim under a generally indorsed writ and that the name of the defendant company be changed to its correct name, the Wonli Investment Sdn. Bhd.

The defendants have appealed to us.

With respect to learned Counsel for the defendants, I do not think that there is any merit in this appeal.

The Rules of the Supreme Court are intended to facilitate, not impede, the administration of civil justice.

In the bad old days in England from where we took our Rules, if you put a comma wrong you were thrown out of court, so strict were they about technicalities.

But over the years this strictness gave way to common sense, and every time the Rules were amended it was with the object of removing fussy technicalities, and making it easier for parties to get justice.

This changed attitude was reflected in the remarks of Lord Collins MR about 70 years ago in Re Coles and Ravenshe