JUDGMENT

Wan Suleiman FJ:

Civil Appeals No. 34, 35 and 36 of 1983 concern 3 suits by a total of 157 persons who claimed to be Penghulus Kampong who had filed the suits against the 3 respondents who were the Menteri Besar, the State Secretary and the Government of the State of Kelantan, respectively.

The plaintiffs in the 3 suits alleged that their dismissal by the first defendant/respondent had been unconstitutional and unlawful, that there had been breach of the relevant constitutional provision of the Kelantan State Constitution as well as Article 8 of the Federal Constitution, and in their prayer they sought:

(1) a declaration that the State Government unconstitutionally acted in dismissing the plaintiffs as Penghulus;

(2) a declaration that such dismissal was contrary to Clause LX (first part) of the Constitution;

(3) an order that the plaintiffs be reinstated as Penghulus alternatively

(4) an enquiry into damages in respect of annual allowances, travelling allowances, gratuity and/or pensions due to the plaintiffs. They also sought further or other reliefs.

The defendants/respondents did not file a defence but an application was made under O. 18 r. 19 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 for the writ to be struck out on the grounds that

(a) it discloses no reasonable cause of action;

(b) it is frivolous, vexatious, irregular, null and void, and

(c) it is otherwise an abuse of the process of Court.

In the affidavit in support of the summons-in-chambers the Legal Adviser, Kelantan, Counsel of the defendants/respondents, averred that since the acts in dismissing these Penghulus Kampong were done in the execution of their public duties in accordance with the authority provided by the relevant regulations and since all the plaintiffs had filed their respective actions too late they were statute barred by s. 2 (a) of the Public Authorities Protection Act 1948.

Dato' Wan Mustapha for the appellants now says that limitation has to be pleaded.

We need not go further than to refer to the judgment of this Court in Tio Chee Hing & Ors. v. Government of Sabah [1981] 1 MLJ 207 where this Court referring to the Court of Appeal decision in Riches v. Director of Public Prosecutions [1973] 2 AER 935 which decided that where it is clear that the defendant was going to rely on the statute of limitations and there was nothing before the Court to suggest that the plaintiffs could escape from it, the claim would be struck out. An extract from the judgment of Davies LJ at p. 939 is relevant:

In the light of those more recent authorities I think, as I say, that perhaps the observations of this Court in Dismore v. Milton went too far. I do not want to state definitely that, in a case where it is merely alleged that the Statement of Claim discloses no cause of action, the limitation objection should or would prevail. In principle, I cannot see why not. If there is any room for an escape from the statute, well and good; it can be shown. But in the absence of that it is difficult to see why a defendant should be called on to pay large sums of money and a plaintiff be permitted to waste large sums of his own or somebody else's money in an attempt to pursue a cause of action which has already been barred by the statute of limitations and must fail.

That indeed was the answer of the learned Legal Adviser. We agree with him.

The only other ground taken by the appellants was that where a declaratory judgment is sought the Court may make a declaration irrespective of whether or not a consequential relief could be obtained.

Learned Counsel for the appellants relied on Dyson v.Attorney-General [1911] 1 KB 410. In that case, certain notices, commonly known as Form 4, were issued by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue under the Finance [1909-1910] Act, 1910. The plaintiff was served with such a form, requiring him to make certain returns and deliver them to an appointed officer within thirty days, under a penalty not exceeding £50. Compliance with this require