Peh Swee Chin J

In this case, the plaintiff (hereinafter called 'the chargee'), chargee of five pieces of land described in this originating summons, applied to the court for an order that the same be sold by public auction and for other consequential orders and directions. The defendant (hereinafter called 'the chargor') opposed the same. Before the hearing of the originating summons herein, the intervener applied and was allowed to intervene in the proceedings on the ground that she was a purchaser of one of the five pieces of land in respect of which an order for sale by public auction was being sought by the chargee.

In the result, the chargee's claim was granted in terms of the originating summons over the objections of both the chargor and intervener. Only the intervener has now appealed and I will now give my grounds of judgment only with regard to and with specific reference to the points raised by the intervener's counsel before me.

The first point taken was that the statutory notice of default in Form 16D issued under s 254 of the National Land Code was defective because though it, inter alia, mentioned that the breach of a provision of the charge had continued for a period of seven days prior to the date of the said statutory notice of default, such breach in fact had continued, not for a full seven days but for a period of about six days or a period short of seven days. This came about because the solicitors' notice of demand was dated 11 July 1986 and the said notice of demand itself gave 14 days' time from 11 July 1986 to repay on demand the sum in question. Such 14 days would expire, according to counsel, on 25 November 1986, a date on which the breach of the provision to pay on demand began, and since the said statutory notice of default bore the date of 1 August 1986, the breach had continued for just less than seven days before the issue of the statutory notice of default. Such an agreement was, of course, extremely legalistic in the circumstances.

It must be borne in mind, when considering this argument, that the money lent in the instant case was expressly made payable on demand. The statutory notice of default must have been enacted with the object of giving sufficient notice to a chargor before an order of sale by public auction is applied for: Jacob v Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp [1974] 2 MLJ 161 .

In my view, such an object was patently complied with in regard to the sum which was repayable on mere demand on the facts above. The learned Lord President Suffian, in giving judgment in Jacob's case [1974] 2 MLJ 161 , also referred to s 26 of the Interpretation Act 1967 about any deviation in form which had no substantial effect, not invalidating the statutory notice of default therein. I respectfully adopt the same argument as after all the minor irregularity complained of did not go to the roots of the chargee's rights: Tan Kai Kok v Thor Teik Seng [1935] MLJ 91 .

The second point raised briefly by the intervener was that she signed the sale agreement in respect of one of five pieces of land as purchaser together with the chargor as vendor on 19 June 1980 while the new charge in connection with her piece of land was created and registered by the chargee in 1983. She was an innocent purchaser for value and the title of her land did not bear the endorsement of any charge when she bought it.

Before I comment on the submission stated above, I shall like to make it clear that though the facts of any given case may sometimes give rise to all sorts of speculative issues, however, at the end of the day, it is only the issues, whether on questions of law or fact, which are specifically and actually raised or pleaded that invite the adjudication by the court which cannot go outside the pleadings or statements in the nature of the pleadings.

It was with this attitude that the court's manner of dealing with the aforesaid submission ought to be reviewed.

It was only too obvious to the court that the ground of the inter