JUDGMENT

Mahadev Shankar JCA:

Only two submissions were made before us by the appellant. The first was that this Court could not reverse the decisions of the Privy Council and therefore that South East Asia Fire Bricks v. Non-Metallic Mineral Products Manufacturers Employees Union & Ors. [1981] AC 363 was still binding on us and Syarikat Kenderaan Melayu Kelantan Bhd. v. Transport Workers Union [1995] 2 CLJ 748 should be ignored as being ultra vires.

My learned brother Abdul Malek Ahmad JCA has dealt with this aspect of the matter in some depth and I do not need to say anymore about it except that there are exceptions even to the rule that the Court of Appeal is bound to follow its own decisions: See Hendry v. De Cruz [1949] MLJ Supp. 25 at p. 27.

The second submission poses the question whether the Ruler of the State of Pahang had the power to lease Sultanate lands to "a body of persons corporate" or a limited company like Sathask Realty Sdn. Bhd. ('Sathask').

Section 2 of the Pahang General Clauses Enactment No. 1 of 1897 reads:

2. In this Enactment and in every written law whether made before or after the commencement of this Enactment, unless there be something repugnant in the subject or context -

(xviii) "Person" shall include any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not.

Pahang already had a Companies Enactment in 1897 - See Pahang Enactment No. 19 of 1897. This was subsequently consolidated and amended by The Companies Enactment 1917 (Enactment No. 20 of 1917) (See The Laws of the Federated Malay States by A.B Voules Vol. III p. 160).

So by the time the Sultanate Lands Enactment (Pahang Enactment No. 1 of 1919) ('the Enactment') came into force on 6 June 1919 the concept of the corporate personality was well entrenched into the laws of Pahang.

Originally leases under s. 6 of the Enactment were restricted to a term not exceeding 50 years. From 28 December 1972 this period was extended to 99 years by Pahang Enactment No. 9 of 1972.

The lease to Sathask first granted on 1 July 1964 was for a period of 50 years. After the Enactment was amended in 1972 a new lease was substituted for the existing lease for a period of 99 years.

The Tribunal Khas, constituted under s. 7 of the Enactment (the special tribunal) took the view that the entities to whom Sultanate Lands could be leased had to be persons of flesh and blood. In supporting this conclusion appellant's Counsel referred us to Re Dodwell & Co. Ltd.'s Trust Deed [1978] 2 All ER 738 (Dodwell), and Halsbury Laws of England Vol. 4 para. 903, and Vol. 8 paras. 837-65. With respect, both these authorities were in fact against him.

In Dodwell the issue was whether the word "person" in s. 164(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 which restricts accumulations of income could apply to a company. Walton J held it could not because the original statute which the 1925 Act consolidated, "was by its, phraseology and expression intended to be confined to natural persons". It is manifestly apparent that the Accumulations Act 1800, and the New South Wales Conveyancing Act 1919 dealt with persons equated with life and death. At the risk of some distortion I would emphasise that the object of this Legislation was to restrict the accumulation of income beyond a specified number of years from the death of the settler.

The Enactment clearly recognised that the Ruler had power to lease Sultanate lands both to his Malay subjects and to others.

Sections 5 and 6 of the Enactment must of course be construed together. By s. 6(i)(a) the power of the Ruler of the State to lease Sultanate lands to his Malay subjects was unconditional and absolute. The restrictions only came into play if the lease was to be to a person who was not a Malay subject of the Ruler.

In such a situation the concurrence of both the Ruler and the Menteri Besar was required either by way of lease or other written authority. The interposition of the Menteri Besar must have been to ensur