SUPPLEMENTARY JUDGMENT

On 11 December, 1997 I delivered a written judgment in favour of the Plaintiffs in respect of prayers 1, 2, 4 and 10 of their claims. There was no order in respect of prayer 3 as it would be academic as the prospectus had been carried into effect. Prayer 5 is in the alternative to prayer 1(b) and I made no order.

As prayers 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the re-amended statement of claim and paragraph 25A of the re-amended statement of [2] defence, that is, set-off, were not addressed by the counsels pending the determination of the Court on the main prayers, I then invited both counsels to address on those prayers. It was then agreed by both counsels for them to do so on 19 December, 1997. In the meantime, Miss Ambiga, counsel for the Defendant, applied for an interim order of stay pending the filing of a formal application by the Defendant for an order of stay pending appeal against my judgment. Dato Kandan, counsel for the Plaintiffs, acting on the instructions of his clients objected for the interim order of stay. However, I allowed it and ordered the formal application for an order of stay be heard also on 19 December, 1997.

Prayers 6 and 7

Dato Kandan, intimated that prayer 7 is covered by prayer 6 as the Plaintiffs are entitled at their election to judgment for either. Prayer 6 reads -

"An inquiry as to damages or at the Plaintiffs' option an account of profits and payment of all sums found due upon taking such inquiry or account".

Miss Ambiga, counsel for the Defendant submitted that the Plaintiffs should make the election before me. However, Dato Kandan was of the view that the Plaintiffs could make the election before the Registrar, who will hear the assessment of damages. (See Island Records [3]Limited v. Tring International Plc. & Anor, Fleet Street Reports of Industrial Property Cases from Commonwealth and Europe (1995) F.S.R. Vol. 22 p. 560). I agreed with Dato Kandan as the assessment is to be heard by the Registrar, election will then be made to the Registrar before proceeding with the hearing of the assessment of damages (see Order 37 rule 1).

I accordingly made a declaratory order in terms of prayer 6 and made no order as to prayer 7.

Prayer 8

Dato Kandan, counsel for the Plaintifs, indicated subsequently that he had his clients' instructions not seek for an order under prayer (8).

I therefore made no order.

Prayer 9

The issue here is whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to interest of 8% per annum on any damages ordered to be paid from the date of the writ (12/11/92) or the date of the judgment (11/12/97). The operative words in prayer 9 are "from the date hereof".

Considering the words "from the date hereof" in their ordinary meaning would mean, in my view, that the Plaintiffs are plainly claiming interest from the date of [4] the filing of the writ. Are the Plaintiffs entitled to do so?

Section 11 of the Civil Law Act 1956 would seem to confer a right to pre-judgment interest. Section 11 reads -

"In any proceedings tried in any Court for the recovery of any debt or damages, the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that there shall be included in the sum for which judgment is given interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the whole or any part of the debt or damages for the whole or any part of the period between the date when the cause of action arise and the date of the judgment: Provided that nothing in this section -

(a) shall authorise the giving of interest upon interest;

(b) shall apply in relation to any debt upon which interest is payable as of right whether by virtue of any agreement or otherwise; or

(c) shall affect the damages recoverable for the dishonour of a bill of exchange. "

It would appear that interest is claimable from the date when the cause of action arise. However, whether to award interest from the date of the writ, as claimed by the Plaintiffs, is a matter within the discretion of the Court. In Harbutt's "Plasticine" Ltd. v. Wayne Tank & Pump Co. Ltd. (1970) 1 Q.B. 447, Lord