JUDGMENT

Shaik Daud Ismail JCA:

This case was originally heard in the Sessions Court which gave judgment to the appellant but on appeal, the High Court reversed the decision of the Sessions Court and entered judgment for the respondents. In considering this appeal, we regret to say that we could not rely on the judgment of the learned judge of the High Court which is rather short, sketchy and without condescending to reasons and detailed analysis of the factual evidence as found and accepted by the learned Sessions Judge. The trial before the learned Sessions Judge took some 26 days with four days for submission by both sides. This case depends mainly on finding of facts by the Sessions Judge and it is trite law that an appellate court should be slow in disturbing findings of fact by a trial judge. This, however, does not mean that an appellate court is prohibited from analysing those findings of fact and come to a different conclusion but in doing so, the appellate court ought to give reasons therefore. Sad to say in the present appeal we find that the learned judge failed to give any reasons whatsoever for rejecting the findings of fact by the Sessions Judge. In the light of this it is now open for us to evaluate the evidence as found by the learned Sessions Judge.

The respondents had sued both the appellants in the Sessions Court alleging that the death of one Pearly Chia Cheen Choo ("the deceased") was caused by the negligence of both the appellants in managing her when she was admitted to the second appellant's medical centre. The principal allegation against the appellants was the failure of the medical centre to store blood when undertaking the delivery of the deceased's baby on 19 June 1988, and consequently failed to transfuse blood to her on time.

The evidence shows that the deceased was admitted into the second appellant's medical centre on 18 June 1988, for the delivery of her baby ie, the first respondent. The first respondent was successfully delivered by the first appellant at 4.50pm the same day. Later, at the request of a nurse at the centre, the deceased's husband, the second respondent, was requested to go to the Blood Bank at the Kuala Lumpur General Hospital to take delivery of blood which was required by the deceased. After taking delivery of the blood, he returned to the centre with the blood but was informed that his wife had passed away. The record shows that the deceased died at 7.30pm. Post mortem evidence given by the pathologist Dr. Abdul Karim shows that the deceased died as a result of post-partum haemorrhage, in other words, she bled to death.

After minutely evaluating the evidence of all the witnesses in detail including that of the first appellant and the medical records of the deceased, the learned Sessions Judge rightly came to the conclusion that the first issue she had to decide was whether the appellants, who were the defendants in the lower court, were negligent in not storing blood at the second appellant's premises where the deceased was admitted for delivery. The respondents relied on the evidence of one Dr. Amrik Singh a general practitioner who categorically stated that blood must be stored, as this practice was adhered to by government hospitals where he was posted before. This view was opposed by the first appellant himself who testified that the deceased was a low risk case and that there was no requirement that medical centres such as the second appellant, should have a blood bank. This was confirmed by one Dr. S. Das the medical superintendent and anaesthetist of the second appellant who also attended to the deceased. Furthermore, there was an arrangement existing between the second appellant and the Kuala Lumpur General Hospital Blood Bank as regards any request for blood. In this case when he noticed the deceased was bleeding the first appellant gave her hartman's solution and haemacel, so as to maintain her blood pressure and at the same time in anticipation of a blood tr