JUDGMENT

Pajan Singh Gill JCA:

The appellant appeals against the decision of the learned judge of the High Court at Miri, who had dismissed the appellant's appeal against the ruling of the learned deputy registrar of the High Court, on an issue in regard to the admissibility of certain documents in the course of a hearing, for assessment of damages. The documents ruled inadmissible, were a re-amended statement of claim, notes of proceedings, and judgment, in respect of Miri High Court Sivil Suit No. MR 26 of 1990. The learned deputy registrar had disallowed the admissibility of the abovementioned documents, after having heard submissions by counsel for both parties, following an objection by the counsel for the plaintiff.

On appeal before the learned judge, and before us, both counsel for the appellant/defendant, and respondent/plaintiff, argued on a preliminary issue, as to whether the appeal from the ruling by the deputy registrar in regard to the admissibility of the documents was competent, and properly brought before the learned judge, in view of the definition of the word "decision", under sub-s. 3 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This definition came into force on 1 August 1998 vides. 2 of the Courts of Judicature (Amendment) Act 1998.

It was also contended before us by the appellant's counsel, whether the appeal judge was correct in his interpretation of O. 56 r. 1 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. Counsel addressed the court as to the function of a judge hearing an appeal as a judge in chambers, from the decision of the deputy registrar of the High Court.

Appellant counsel also took the view that having regard to the nature, purpose, and function, of the appeal process under O. 56 r. 1 of the Rules of the High Court 1980, the application of the amended definition of the word "decision", pursuant to s. 3 of the Courts of Judicature Act (Amended) Act 1998, would militate against the spirit of O. 56 r. 1 of the RHC 1980. For the record, O. 56 r. 1 of the Rules of the High Court provides as follows:

(1) An appeal shall lie to a judge in chambers from any 'judgment', 'order' or 'decision' of the registrar.

It was also the appellant counsel's argument that the word "decision" in O. 56 r. 1 should not be ascribed with the meaning as provided in s. 3 of the Courts of Judicature Act (Amended) Act 1998, as it goes against the grain of authorities such as Tuan Haji Ahmed Abdul Rahman v. Arab-Malaysia Finance[1996] 1 CLJ 241, and Seloga Jaya Sdn Bhd v. Pembinaan Keng Ting (Sabah) Sdn Bhd[1994] 2 CLJ 716which state that an appeal pursuant to O. 56 r. 1 proceeds by way of a rehearing, that is to say, the judge is to treat the case as if it was being heard for the first time by him. To subscribe to the meaning of "decision" as provided for in s. 3 of the amended Courts of Judicature Act 1964 to O. 56 Rules of the High Court would be incompatible with the ethos of the aforesaid judgments. Shortly put, counsel contended, that there was no "decision" or "appeal" to speak of, in the context of O. 56 RHC 1980, and the judge was to treat the case as if it was being heard for the first time.

Interesting as this proposition is, we regrettably differ in our views as to the impact of an appeal under O. 56 RHC 1980. To this court, O. 56 r. 1 speaks of an appeal to begin with, and even though the authorities speak of the appeal as proceedings by way of a rehearing, it does not to our mind detract from the fact, that it still remains an appeal against a "judgment", "order", or "decision" of the registrar of the High Court. The authorities, we feel, only serve as a guideline to the peculiar judicial approach, whilst hearing an appeal pursuant to O. 56 of the RHC 1980. The fact remains to us, that the legislature, and the Rules Committee in their wisdom intended the powers exercised by a judge, pursuant to O. 56 to be in his appellate capacity. The matter is thus cadit quaestio.

As to whether the meanin