JUDGMENT

Mohamed Dzaiddin CJ:

The brief facts of the case giving rise to this appeal are as follows. Both the appellant and respondent are senior lawyers practising under the style of their personal names. Some time in March 1996, the appellant made a press statement published in two local English dailies concerning the conduct of the respondent in issuing a dishonoured cheque to the appellant. As a result of the above publication, the respondent sued the appellant and the two English dailies for libel and claimed damages, injunctions and costs.

The High Court gave judgment for the respondent against the three defendants. As against the appellant, the trial judge awarded RM500,000 for compensatory and aggravated damages with interest at the rate of 4% per annum from the date of the press statement, and costs.

The appellant appealed against the whole of the decision. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against liability. On quantum, it held that the award was excessive and reduced the amount awarded by the High Court. The Court of Appeal did not however disturb the award of interest of 4% per annum.

On further appeal, leave was granted by this court on the following question of law:

Whether in a defamation action, interest ought to be awarded by court on the damages ordered to be paid, particularly, where no claim for interest on the adjudged sum is made in the writ of summons or statement of claim and there is no omnibus prayer therein seeking any further or other relief deemed fit and proper by the Honourable Court.

Before us, the thrust of Encik Karpal Singh's argument was that interest could not be awarded on damages in a defamation action. First, he contended that in the present case interest was not specifically pleaded in the indorsement in the writ of summons or in the statement of claim. There was also no omnibus prayer seeking any further or other relief in the pleadings. Encik Karpal Singh relied on a passage in Gatley on Libel and Slander, 9th edn, para. 26.36, which states, inter alia, that "where there is no claim for interest, no interest will be awarded in the absence of amendment."

Secondly, he submitted that the Court of Appeal had seriously misdirected itself when it affirmed the High Court's award of 4% interest on the reduced amount of damages against him. He relied on Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew[1992] 2 SLR 310, following Saunders & Anor v. Edwards & Anor[1987] 1 WLR 1116 which held that interest was not awarded on damages in defamation actions.

In reply, Encik Vijandran submitted that the paragraph in Gatley which was relied by the appellant is the current position in England. He pointed out that under the new O. 18 r. 8(4) of the (English) Rules of the Supreme Court, all claims for interest must be specifically pleaded, whereas the corresponding provision in our Rules of the High Court 1980 has not been amended. Relying on Jefford and Another v. Gee[1970] 1 All ER 1202, Encik Vijandran submitted that the court may award interest despite it not being pleaded in the statement of claim.

After considering O. 18 r. 8 Rules of the High Court 1980and the English Supreme Court Practice 1997, vol. 1 on O. 18 r. 8(4), I agree with Encik Vijandran that in this case the applicable rule is our O. 18 r. 8. Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision that claims for interest must be pleaded in the pleadings in the Rules of the High Court 1980, a judge in the exercise of his discretion can award such interest. See: Lim Eng Kay v. Jaafar bin Mohamed Said[1982] CLJ 298; [1982] CLJ (Rep) 190; Riches v. Westminster Bank Ltd[1943] 2 All ER 725; Jefford and Another v. Gee, supra.

On the substantive issue, he submitted that we should follow some Commonwealth countries where prejudgment interest on defamation damages can be awarded. He referred us to authorities from Australia, Canada and Hong Kong which I shall examine shortly. The respondent also drew an analogy with the award of interest on personal