JUDGMENT

Raus Sharif J:

This is an application by way of originating summons by the plaintiffs as per encl. 3 for the following orders:

1. A declaration be and is hereby given that the complaint by the Bar Council Malaysia dated 12 November 1997 against the plaintiffs is null and void and of no effect.

2. The whole of the disciplinary proceedings instituted by the first defendant against the plaintiffs in respect of the complaint by the Bar Council of Malaysia dated 12 November 1997 is illegal, null and void.

3.(a) The appointment of the Investigation Tribunal by the first defendant does not comply with s. 100(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (as amended).

(b) The appointment of the Investigation Tribunal by the first defendant is and/or was therefore, incurably illegal, void and of no effect.

(c) The appointment of the second defendant by the first defendant under s. 102(2) and 103B of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (as amended) is and/or was therefore, incurably illegal, void and of no effect.

4.(a) An interim injunction be and is hereby granted to restrain the first defendant from hearing disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiffs in respect of the complaint dated 12 November 1997 pending the outcome of the plaintiffs' originating summons against the defendants.

(b) Further and/or in the alternative, that all such further disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiffs be stayed pending the outcome of the plaintiffs' originating summons.

5. The costs of this action be paid by the defendants to the plaintiffs.

6. Any further or consequential order relief or direction this Honourable Court may deem fit.

The brief facts leading to this application are as follows:

On 12 November 1997, the Bar Council Malaysia, (Bar Council) pursuant to s. 99 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 (the Act), made a complaint to the Advocates & Solicitors Disciplinary Board, (Disciplinary Board) against the plaintiffs. The complaint was for an alleged breach of the no-discount rule under the Solicitor's Remuneration Order. On 24 March 1998, the Disciplinary Board asked the plaintiff for an explanation, which was given by the plaintiffs on 2 April 1998.

On 25 July 2002, the plaintiffs had been informed that the Disciplinary Board had appointed an Investigating Tribunal. On the same day, the Investigating Tribunal wrote to the plaintiffs if they had any explanation to the said complaint. The plaintiffs took the position that the delay in appointing the Investigating Tribunal had rendered it void and illegal. They further confirmed that they would stand by the letter of explanation that had already been given to the Disciplinary Board.

The Investigating Tribunal then fixed a hearing on 8 October 2002, whereby the plaintiffs declined to attend. On 9 October 2002, the Investigating Tribunal requested further information from the plaintiffs, which was furnished on 18 October 2002. The Investigating Tribunal in its report made a recommendation for the appointment of Advocates and Solicitor's Disciplinary Committee, (Disciplinary Committee), to make a formal investigation against the plaintiffs in which the plaintiffs had been notified of on 22 July 2003. Following by a letter of 5 August 2003, the plaintiffs had been notified by the Disciplinary Committee that the complaint was fixed for hearing on 26 August 2003.

The plaintiffs filed this application on 12 August, 2003, which in effect seeking this court to restrain the Disciplinary Committee from hearing the complaint which was fixed on 26 August 2003 on the grounds as stated in the application.

In order to understand the factual background of this case, I think it is pertinent to state the scheme of disciplinary proceedings under the Act. As stated in the affidavit filed on behalf of the first and second defendants, historically, the discipline of the legal profession was a matter for the Bar Council and the State Bar Committee. However, because of the increasing public concerns of the disciplinary