JUDGMENT

Haidar Mohd Noor CJ (Malaya)

I have had the opportunity of considering in draft the judgments of Steve L.K. Shim, CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) and Gopal Sri Ram, JCA in respect of the two appeals viz, 03-02-04-2002 (W) and 02-05-2002 (W) before us. I agree that the two appeals be dismissed with costs. I order the deposits to go towards the taxed costs.

I would, in addition, like to expressly state that I agree with the reasons advanced by my learned brother, Chief Judge (Sabah & Sarawak) in answering the questions posed for our consideration. It is clear beyond doubt that in view of s. 17A of the Interpretation Acts 1948 and 1967 there is now a statutory recognition for the courts to take purposive approach in the interpretation of statutes including taxing statutes.

In England, though there is no equivalent provision of our s. 17A there, the House of Lords in dealing with a taxing statute in Pepper v. Hart[1993] AC 593 (by majority) took a purposive approach. This is what Lord Griffiths said at p. 617:

The ever increasing volume of legislation must inevitably result in ambiguities of statutory language which are not perceived at the time the legislation is enacted. The object of the court in interpreting legislation is to give effect so far as the language permits to the intention of the legislature. If the language proves to be ambiguous I can see no sound reason not to consult Hansard to see if there is a clear statement of the meaning that the words were intended to carry. The days have long passed when the courts adopted a strict constructionist view of interpretation which required them to adopt the literal meaning of the language. The courts now adopt a purposive approach which seeks to give effect to the true purpose of legislation and are prepared to look at much extraneous material that bears upon the background against which the legislation was enacted.

The case of Pepper v. Harton the purposive approach was quoted with approval by this court in Chor Phaik Har v. Farlim Properties Sdn Bhd [1994] 4 CLJ 285.

The other interesting issue that was raised before us for the first time is that there is no provision in the Palm Oil Research and Development Act 1979 ('the Act') empowering the Minister to impose research cess on palm oil millers. It is on the ground that the payer of the research cess has not been identified by the Act. Hence counsel for the respondent contended that the Minister not only did not have the legal authority to impose research cess on the crude palm kernel oil ('CPKO') but also on the crude palm oil ('CPO') on the respondent and referred to ss. 2 and 14(1) of the Act. This issue was not raised before the High Court as well as the Court of Appeal.

By the respondent's own prayer in its statement of claim by way of prayer (a) the respondent claims for a declaration that the Minister is not empowered under the Act or the 1979 Order to levy research cess on the respondent for the production and extraction of CPKO. In addition thereto the record of appeal showed that the respondent admitted that as palm oil millers it is liable to pay research cess on CPO and what is disputed by the respondent is that it is not liable to pay research cess on CPKO. It is trite law that the parties are bound by their pleadings (Raphael Pura v. Insas Bhd & Ors [2003] 1 CLJ 61 at p. 98). However, it seemed that the respondent is relying on jurisdictional point in contending that it is entitled to raise the CPO issue before us. (Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v. Arab-Malaysian Finance Bhd [1998] 2 CLJ 75). Be that as it may, for the reasons stated by the learned Chief Judge (Sabah & Sarawak), with which I agree, the jurisdictional point has no merits. In that event I agree that the Court of Appeal was correct to set aside the judgment of the learned High Court Judge on the sole ground that the Minister is not empowered under the Act or the 1979 Order to impose research cess on CPKO on the respondent. In the circumstances I a