JUDGMENT

Mokhtar Sidin JCA:

The appellant is an accountant and on 1 July 1982 she joined the service of the respondent as an accountant and subsequently was appointed to the post of Pengurus Kewangan. By a letter dated 30 October 1995, the respondent seconded the services of the appellant to a holding company called Kelrest Holdings Bhd (hereinafter referred to as " Kelrest " only). The terms and conditions of the secondment are set out in the appendix to the said letter. The appellant did not agree to the secondment and she stated this in her letter dated 1 November 1995 addressed to the Ketua Eksekutif of the respondent. The respondent insisted on the secondment which the appellant refused. As a result the appellant was issued with a show cause letter by the respondent on why disciplinary action ought not to be taken against her and she was given fourteen days to reply.

In her reply, the appellant stated that for any secondment it is necessary to have the prerequisite consent of the officer concerned. The appellant did not consent to the secondment and as such she is entitled to reject the secondment. The respondent expressed its disagreement in its letter dated 4 December 1995 and advised her to return to work. The respondent on the same day wrote to the appellant revoking the secondment to Kelrest and she was eventually transferred to the post of Pengurus Perancangan Strategik & Kawalan vide transfer order dated 5 December 1995.

According to the appellant, the respondent had by its conduct and actions repudiated the contract of employment and by reason of the same, the appellant had regarded herself as being unlawfully dismissed from the employment of the respondent. The appellant then instituted the present action by way of originating summons seeking a declaration that her dismissal was null and void and that for all intents and purposes she is still in the employment of the respondent and is entitled to all benefits and privileges under the employment.

The High Court dismissed her claim with cost. Being dissatisfied with that decision the appellant appealed to this court. We have allowed the appeal earlier and now we give our reasons for doing so.

Before us, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the cause of action is based on the common law of master and servant. It relates to wrongful dismissal as against unjust dismissal under s. 20(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1967. The relief sought in the present appeal is under O. 15 r. 16 of the Rules of the High Court. The appellant did not seek relief under the Industrial Relations Act 1967 because s. 52 of that Act precludes her from doing so. For that reason the Industrial Relations Act 1967 is not applicable.

The learned counsel further submitted that the learned trial judge found that the appellant was right in refusing to go on secondment. In his judgment the learned judge stated:

The defendant argued, based on the said clause the plaintiff could be posted to any post as the defendant deems fit including to a company in which the defendant has an interest. Kelrest is one such company. It is, therefore, wrong for the plaintiff to object to the secondment. On the strength of clause 2(f), the defendant contended that no prior consent of the plaintiff is necessary to give effect to such a secondment. With respect, I disagree with the defendant. In my opinion the words " di mana-mana tempat " as appearing in clause 2(f) could not be given such a broad interpretation, they should be given their natural and ordinary meaning. Adopting this approach, it appears to me that what clause 2(f) seeks to provide is that the plaintiff may be posted to any place (tempat) as the defendant may, at its discretion, decide but such posting should only be confined to within its own organization. In other words, the said paragraph did not permit the defendant to second the plaintiff to Kelrest which is a different legal entity. If the defendant chooses to do so then it has, f