JUDGMENT

Suriyadi Halim Omar JCA:

[1] The panel allowed this appeal with costs and we had accordingly set aside the interim injunction order granted by the High Court on 7 November 2008.

[2] At the outset, it must be clarified that with the High Court order being interim in nature, much of our focus was directed on such type of injunctions, though touching on some aspect of permanent injunctions against the Government, its departments and servants was inevitable. It is quite established now that we were merely to review the decision of the learned judge and conclude whether he had correctly applied all the right principles when meting down the interim injunction. It is not incumbent upon us to substitute his decision premised on the ground that we would have arrived at a different finding, had we been in his shoes, subject to him having correctly adhered to all the established legal principles. If either he has committed an error in law, misconceived the facts, not giving sufficient weight to relevant matters but taking into account irrelevant ones or the decision would result in injustice, it then becomes incumbent upon us to set that order aside (Vijayalakshmi Devi Nachatiram v. Dr Mahadevan Nadchatiram & Ors [1995] 3 CLJ 493). In S & F International Ltd. v. Trans-con Engineering Sdn Bhd [1985] 2 CLJ 228; [1985] CLJ (Rep) 280 the Federal Court had occasion to state:

We should perhaps also reiterate and stress the point that the discretion whether or not to grant an interlocutory injunction is vested in the High Court judge and not the appellate court whose function initially is one of review only, and it will not overrule the decision of the judge at first instance unless, broadly speaking, he has made an error of law or misconceived the facts, and except in those circumstances it must defer to the judge's exercise of his discretion and must not interfere with it merely upon the ground that the members of the appellate court would have exercised the discretion differently ...

[3] We now supply the reasons why we allowed the appeal. The appellants had supplied four main grounds for our consideration, viz. the court had granted an interim injunction even though:

i. that injunctive relief was never sought out in the writ;

ii. section 29 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 (GPA) and s. 54 of the Specific Relief Act 1950 (SRA), do not permit the granting of any injunction against the government and government departments respectively;

iii. the balance of convenience did not favour the granting of such an order; and

iv. damages were adequate to compensate the respondent in the event it wins the main suit.

[4] But first we reproduce the salient facts of the matter before us. The respondent purchased the impugned land (hereinafter referred to as the land) in 1988 at a purchase price of RM3,500,000, and as pleaded, it has a current estimated value of RM14,000,000. It then became the registered owner of it. The respondent subsequently obtained approval for the erection of buildings on the land from Dewan Bandaraya Kuching Utara (DBKU), subject to the terms and conditions listed in the letter of approval. Due to stoppages in the construction works and with the site being deeply excavated it became a danger to the adjoining land and public at large. The approved building plan subsequently lapsed. Due to the non-compliance of that building plan, what with the existence of danger to the adjoining land and the public, after statutory notices had been served on the respondent, the appellants re-entered and forfeited the land on 13 February 2006. A certificate of re-entry dated 13 February 2006 was gazetted by the Sarawak Government and a memorial of the re-entry was noted on the land Registry to legalise that repossession.

[5] A respite of relief against the forfeiture over the land was granted but subject to certain terms and conditions, amongst them that the plan for the development of the land be approved by the State Plann