JUDGMENT

Jeffrey Tan FCJ:

[1] On 13 January 2014, we unanimously dismissed the applicant's application (application) for leave to file a notice of appeal to this court. We now give our reasons.

[2] Briefly stated, the applicant was charged at the Kuala Lumpur Sessions court for the following offence under s 84(1) read together with s 122C of the Securities Industry Act 1983:

"That you, between 26 March 2004 and 28 October 2004 at Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad, 14th Floor, Exchange Square, Bukit Kewangan, 50250 Kuala Lumpur, abetted Goh Hock Choy (NRIC No: 621010-05-5331) who caused to be created a misleading appearance of active trading in Lii Hen Industries Berhad (Company No: 301361-U) shares on a stock market, that is, Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad, where Goh Hock Choy was indirectly concerned in transactions of sale and purchase of Lii Hen Industries Berhad shares that did not involve any change in the beneficial ownership of the said Lii Hen Industries Berhad shares, executed through the central depository securities accounts listed in the Appendix to this charge, and the said offence was committed pursuant to your abetment and you have thereby committed an offence under s 84(1) read together with s 122C(c) of the Securities Industry Act 1983 (Act 280), punishable under s 88B of the same Act."

[3] But before trial could commence, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion (motion) at the High court to strike out/quash/permanently stay the charge.The main ground for the motion was that the applicant was a 'whistleblower' who was entitled therefore to the immunity and protection under the Whistleblower Act 2010. On 5 February 2013, the High court dismissed the motion. The applicant appealed. On 13 September 2013, the court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The applicant promptly lodged a Notice of Appeal against the decision of the court of Appeal. But on 27 September 2013, the applicant was notified by the Registry of this court that the said Notice of Appeal could not be processed, and which Notice of Appeal was then returned to the applicant, by reason of s 87(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 ("CJA"), which provides:

"(1) The Federal court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any appeal from any decision of the court of Appeal in its appellate jurisdiction in respect of any criminal matter decided by the High court in its original jurisdiction subject to any rules regulating the proceedings of the Federal court in respect of appeals from the court of Appeal."

[4] In other words, s 87(1) of the CJA provides that the Federal court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any appeal from any decision (as defined in s 3 of the CJA) of the court of Appeal if the criminal matter were decided (to follow the meaning of 'decision' as defined in s 3 of the CJA) by the High court in its original jurisdiction. Otherwise, " ...there is no right of appeal to the Federal court in a criminal matter that originated in the subordinate courts" (; [2007] 2 MLJ 101; [2007] 1 CLJ 565 per Augustine Paul FCJ). "This section ...does not provide for appeals in criminal matters originating in the subordinate courts" (; [2008] 3 MLJ 753; [2008] 5 CLJ 201 per Zaki Azmi PCA, as he then was). "In a criminal matter which originated from the sessions court, as in this case, the court of Appeal stands as the apex court. No further appeal shall lie to the Federal court. The appeal should stop at the court of Appeal" ; [2010] 3 MLJ 285; [2010] 1 CLJ 802 per Raus Sharif FCJ, as he then was).

[5] The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor hence submitted that the applicant had no standing to make the application to the Federal court, as the matter originated from a subordinate court. The other substantive point made by the learned DPP was that the application for leave to file an appeal was "unknown in law" as there was no provision in s 87(1) for the grant of leave to appeal in a criminal matter.

[6] Learned counsel for the applicant arg