KC Chan J:

Grounds 1 and 5 - The Control of Rent Ordinance 1956 came force on 1 July 1956 The appellant paid rent to the respondent on 10 July 1956 but that was in respect of the period 10 June to 9 July 1956 rent being payable in arrear. Therefore the 1956 Ordinance does not apply to this tenancy. s. 12(1)(j) of the 1956 Ordinance refers to monthly tenancy, so the tenant could not have received the rent to which this paragraph applies. The purpose of the Control of Rent Ordinance is the protection of one section of the public from the other. b Odgers' Construction of Deeds & Statutes, 3rd Edn p. 318 Croxford v. Universal Insurance Co [1936] 2 KB 253.

A statute must be construed in favour of the class of persons for whose protection it was passed. Woon Guat Chin (f) V. Lim Sian Poon [1954] 1 MLRH 17; [1954] 1 MLJ 184 . In the present case, rent was not "due" The notice to quit was given on 11 August 1956. Before the notice was issued the appellant had not been receiving rent.

Ground 2 - The respondent purchased the property and became landlord on 1 August 1956 The alleged breach took place before the respondent became the owner and landlord. His predecessor in title never took any legal action against the appellant. Can respondent exercise a right which accrued to his predecessor in title? Woodfall, p. 834.

Ground 3 - There is no evidence to show that the respondent acquired the cause of action accruing to his predecessor. Ground 4 - Meenachi Sundram's case (1955) MLJ 128 has no application. Ground 6 - Refer i Hooi Moon v.

Suppiah Chettiar (1954) MLJ 186. The tenancy was terminated on 10 October 1956. But the appellant had not been receiving rent for three months before that The tenantt should be given the protection of a statutory tenant.

HT Ong: Yong Hon Chong V. Harbans Singh; [1949] 1 MLJ 99 is binding on the Court The law applicable is the law in force at the time the action is commeneed. The defendant for a number of years paid $50 rent to the owners and collected $92,50 from his subtenants. She was in breach of the Control of Rent ordinance, 1948, s. 13(1)(j) until that was replaced by the 1956 Ordinance. Whichever way the Court looks at the appellant's action she was in breach of a statutory provision. When she received $92,50 on 10 July 1956 she was clearly in breach of the 1956 Ordinance. It is a fallacy to talk about the respondent acquiring or not acquiring a cause of action. The Ordinance does not give to the landlords a cause of action that did not exist before. what it does is to fetter the common law right of landlords so long as the tenants themselves are not at fault. Once the fetter has been removed by the fault of the tenant then the tenant ceases to have the protection of the Ordinance. The fetter never existed during respondent's time as landlord. Up to the termination of the contractual tenancy there was a contract by the sub-tenant to pay $92,50 per month to the tenant. The contract existed at all times up to 10 October 1956 The contract was rescinded or modified by consensual agreement. Would the appellant have been able to distrain on the goods and chattels of the respondent for $92.50? Yes Wagner's case (1947) MLJ 33; Sarah cashin's case (1955) MLJ 52; and Chung Lai Heng's case (1952) MLJ 232. The Contract to pay is equivalent to receiving.

Chan in reply: From 10 August 1956 the appellant was refusing to accept $92.50 rent. Therefore the contract to pay that amount was rescinded.

Ong: Tenan must put himself in the right to claim the protection of the section. The test must be the conduct of the tenant.

Chan: The appellant is free to make new arrangments with the respoindent, especially when the respondent has become the new landlord. There is evidence of negotiation.

Good J:- I am bound by the decision of the Federation Court of Appeal in the case of Yong Hon Chong V. Harbans Singh; [1949] 1 MLJ 99 and, in view of that decision, I rule that the law applicable to the present case