JUDGMENT

Mohamed Dzaiddin J:

The plaintiff's application in Encl. 2 is for a declaration that the forfeiture of the premises known as 1st and 2nd Floors, Pasar Chowrasta, standing on Lot No. 113, (1) TS 18, NED Penang ("the demised premises") on or about 10 June 1987 is illegal and void. Alternatively, the plaintiffs pray for a declaration that they had been dispossessed of the demised premises by the defendants otherwise than in due course of law. If they succeed in their application, the plaintiffs pray that the defendants deliver up possession of the demised premises and pay damages as a result of wrongful dispossession and costs. In Encl. 9, the defendants are asking for an order to strike out the plaintiffs' originating summons under on the ground that the originating summons does not disclose any reasonable cause of action, that it is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court.

The plaintiffs' application is supported by the affidavits of Mr. Lai Giap Hwa, a director of the plaintiff company, affirmed on 9 & 17 September 1987 (Encl. 1 and 6). Both Mr. Ong Chin Seng, the assistant director (general administration and development) and Mr. Ram Belani, the director of legal affairs' of the defendants affirmed their affidavits in reply on 14 September and 6 October 1987 (Encl. 10 and 12). From these affidavits, the following facts are not disputed. By a tenancy agreement dated 16 June 1986 ("the said agreement") the defendants let to the plaintiffs the demised premises for a period of two years commencing from 1 September 1985 at a monthly rental of RM28,500 and upon the terms and conditions therein contained. However, the rental was subsequently reduced to RM22,800 per month with effect from 1 June 1986 vide a supplemental deed dated 29 September 1986. Under the said agreement the plaintiffs are required to pay the rental in advance on the first day of each month. Deposit of RM85,500 being an equivalent of three months' rental was also paid together with the first month rental. It is further provided that "if the rent or any part thereof shall at any time be in arrears and not paid for 14 days after the same shall have become due, whether formally demanded or not, the landlord may at any time thereafter re-enter upon the demised premises and hold and enjoy the same without prejudice to the landlord to any right of action or remedy against the tenant." For the purpose of this application, it is worth mentioning that either party may terminate the tenancy by giving one month's written notice to the other and any notice under the said agreement must be in writing.

Let me first deal with the defendants' application (Encl. 9) asking this Court to strike out the plaintiffs' originating summons made under Upon considering the affidavits of the parties, I find that there are issues to be tried. It is trite that only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to summary procedure under O. 18 r. 19 and the power conferred by this rule will only be exercised by the Court where the case is clear beyond doubt. Although there is no substantial dispute on the facts, I find that the issues of law as raised by the plaintiffs in their application merit consideration. As such, it cannot be said the points of law involved are frivolous, vexatious or the plaintiffs' application discloses no reasonable cause of action and an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, I dismiss the defendants' application (Encl. 9) with costs.

Reverting back to the plaintiffs' application (Encl. 2), it is not disputed that the plaintiffs had been in arrears of the May rental. Provision (i) of Clause 2 of the tenancy agreement clearly states that if the rent thereof reserved or any part thereof shall at anytime be in arrears and not paid for fourteen days after the same shall become due (whether formally demanded or not) then the landlord may at any time thereafter re-enter upon the demised premises and hold and enjoy the same as if th