Judgement Introduction

According to the Petition, the Petitioner had become the owner of the land (the three plots of land) sought to be divested in this application as far back as in 2006. However, the three plots of land had been acquired by the Government. As such, the Section 2 notice had been issued in 1979 for the acquisition of a public purpose, followed by the decision to take immediate possession of the land by the Government in terms of Section 38(a) of the Land Acquisition Act, No. 9 of 1950 (as amended) (hereinafter referred to as the “LA Act”) .

After taking over the possession, the Government has not utilized the land (the three plots of land) for the public purpose for which it had been acquired. Therefore, the Petitioner has sought a divesting order from the 1^st Respondent on the basis that the public purpose for which the land was acquired had been abandoned by the Government; no improvement has been made by the Government on the land upon acquisition, and no compensation for the acquisition had been paid to the Petitioner. In those circumstances, the Petitioner had sought an order for a divesture in terms of Section 39A of the LA Act from the Minister; failing which the Petitioner has filed this application, and has sought inter alia the following reliefs;

“(d) grant and issue a mandate in the nature of Writ of Mandamus compelling and/or directing the 1^st Respondent to make order divesting unto the Petitioner, in terms of Section 39A of the Land Acquisition Act. The subject land of the Petitioner described in the Schedule to Deed of Gift No. 80 dated 07.11.2006 attested by Sandun Gamage N.P (P1) and depicted in Plan No. 677 dated 03.10.1968 prepared by S.Lokanthan, L.S (P2) and/or in Preliminary Village Plan Nos. 140 (P23A), 2792 (P23B) and 2793 (P23C) in so far as it reflects and relates to the land of the Petitioner;”

The Respondents, after formal notices, have filed limited objections, and according to the objections, the Petitioner cannot maintain this application as formulated, since he became the owner or entitled to the land long after the acquisition. This was argued before us on 15.09.2025; hence this judgement.

Arguments

The thrust of the main contention of Mr. Rodrigo, the learned President’s Counsel for the Petitioner, is that the Petitioner seeks a Writ of Mandamus for a divesting order from the 1^st Respondent, in terms of Section 39A of the LA Act on three grounds; namely, nonpayment of compensation in respect of the plots of land that the Petitioner is seeking to divest, the plots have not been utilized for 46 years after the issuance of the Section 2 notice by the Respondents, and no improvement has been effected by the public authority who has acquired the land for a particular public purpose. Elucidating on the same contention, Mr. Rodrigo contended that no compensation has been claimed either by the Petitioner, and no compensation has been paid in respect of which the Petitioner seeks a divesting order; additionally, after the acquisition for a particular public purpose by the Government, no improvement whatsoever has been effected on the acquired land. Therefore, the Petitioner is entitled to the main relief prayed for in the Petition.

However, on the other hand, Ms. Sourajah, the learned State Counsel, contended that compensation was not claimed by the Petitioner or his predecessor, as they have slept over their rights at the correct stage. She contends that he should have claimed compensation when the claim for compensation was called for in terms of Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act.

The next contention of Ms. Sourajah is that except for Lot No.1 and Lot No.44, compensation has been claimed and paid by the Government for Lot No.8. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot seek any divesting order now, although the Petitioner may not have received compensation.

The next contention of Ms. Sourajah is that the Petitioner became entitled to the 3 plots of land somewhere in 2006, whereas the acquisition h