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2024 Supreme(SRI)(CA) 529

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA
Sobhitha Rajakaruna, Mahen Gopallawa, JJ
Embody Trading (Pvt) Ltd vs. Commissioner General of Labour and Others.
CA/WRIT/227/2022



Advocates:
Avindra Rodrigo, PC with Akiel Deen, Nishika Fonseka and Kosala Gurusinghe
for the Petitioner. Maithree Amarasinghe, SSC for the 1st and 2nd Respondents.

The termination of probationary employment must adhere to statutory requirements, ensuring fair procedure and prior consent are obtained as stipulated by law.

Headnote:(A) Termination of Employment of Workmen (Special Provisions) Act No. 45 of 1971 - Section 2 - Probationary Employment - The case addresses whether an employee on probation can be terminated without the required consent of the employee or Commissioner. The Court emphasizes the necessity of adhering to legal procedures in employment termination. (Paras 6, 12, 16)

(B) Natural Justice - The Court reiterates that terminating an employee's probation without proper review and justification undermines Natural Justice principles. Employers must ensure transparency in their processes. (Paras 20-21)

Facts of the case:
The Petitioner contested an order from the Commissioner General of Labour requiring it to reinstate an employee whose probationary services were terminated. It was ruled that termination during probation required adherence to TEWA’s provisions.

Findings of Court:
The appeal was dismissed, affirming the required legal processes for terminating probationary employment must be followed without deviating from statutory requirements.

Issues: The legality of terminating employment during probation without the requisite consent and procedure, and adherence to the principles of Natural Justice.

Ratio Decidendi: The termination of employment during probation must comply with TEWA mandates, ensuring that employees are treated fairly and with due respect to their rights, establishing that mere acceptance of an employment offer does not equate to prior written consent.

Result: Application dismissed.

Sobhitha Rajakaruna J.

The Petitioner Company has instituted the instant proceedings seeking a writ of Certiorari quashing the decisions of the 1st Respondent- Commissioner General of Labour reflected in ‘P2A’ by which the Petitioner was directed to reinstate the 3rd Respondent who was an employee serving the period of probation at the Petitioner Company. The Petitioner was compelled to reinstate the 3rd Respondent with effect from 21.04.2022 and pay a sum of Rs. 969,000.00 to him as back wages for the period between 31.10.2021 and 20.04.2022. The 1st Respondent has made the said Order based on an Application made by the said 3rd Respondent under the Termination of Employment of Workmen (Special Provisions) Act No. 45 of 1971 (‘TEWA’).

The 3rd Respondent was recruited by the Petitioner subject to a period of probation with effect from 08.03.2021 and the respective letter of appointment is marked as ‘P2(ii)(a)’. The probation period stipulated in the said letter of appointment is six months and accordingly, such period was due to conclude on 07.09.2021. However, the period of probation of the 3rd Respondent was extended by two months with effect from 07.09.2021 by a letter bearing the same date, marked ‘P2(iv)’. However, at the inquiry before the Commissioner of Labour the Petitioner has admitted that the said letter ‘P2(iv)’ had not been accepted by the 3rd Respondent placing his signature (Vide- Proceedings before the Commissioner of Labour on 12.01.2022). Subsequently, by letter dated 31.10.2021, marked ‘P2(iii)’, his services were terminated before the lapse of the said extended period of probation which was due to end on 06.11.2021.

There is no dispute that the services of the 3rd Respondent were terminated while he was serving during his extended period of probation. In terms of Section 2 (1) of TEWA, it is mandatory that no employer shall terminate the scheduled employment of any workman without (a) the prior consent in writing of the workman or (b) the prior written approval of the Commissioner. The 1st Respondent issued the impugned order on the basis that the Petitioner has failed to obtain the written consent of the 3rd Respondent or the prior approval of the Commissioner of Labour before terminating the services of the 3rd Respondent.

The primary argument of the Petitioner is that the written consent of the 3rd Respondent is not necessary as the 3rd Respondent has accepted the said letter of appointment placing his signature which gives the authority to terminate the services during the period of probation without notice. Such arguments are formulated by the Petitioner based on the following contents under the subheading ‘Probation’ in the letter of appointment;

“You will be on probation for a period of 6 months, which may be extended at the discretion of the management. During this period, your employment may be terminated by the Management without notice.”

The Petitioner contends that by accepting the said letter of appointment, the 3rd Respondent has expressed his consent to the termination of his services by the Petitioner during the period of probation without any notice. However, the Respondents argue that in terms of Section 2 (1) of TEWA, it is mandatory that the Petitioner who is the employer obtain either the written consent of the employee or prior approval of the said Commissioner before terminating the services of such an employee. Thus, the primary question that needs to be resolved by this Court is whether the acceptance of the letter of appointment marked ‘P2(ii)(a)’ by placing the signature can be considered prior written consent of the 3rd Respondent that is required under the Section 2 (1)(a) of the TEWA.

It is noted that the services of the 3rd Respondent have been terminated not during the first period of six months of his services but during the extended period of probation which can be considered as the second term of the period of probation. In Lanka Canneries (Pvt) Ltd v. Commissioner of Labou

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