Appellant, and Respondent

When a Corporation is represented by a proctor, a plaint filed on behalf of the Corporation would be sufficiently signed as required by section 470 of the Civil Procedure Code if it is signed only by the proctor; the plaint need not be subscribed by anyone else on behalf of the Corporation.


Once the Court accepts and acts on a proxy filed in favour of a proctor, presumably because no defect appears on the face of the proxy, any party who desires to question the authority of that proctor has the onus of showing the want of authority. Accordingly, once the Court accepts and acts on a proxy given to a proctor by the Incorporated Council of Legal Education, when it is plaintiff in an action, the Court is entitled to assume, in the absence of evidence led to the contrary by the defendant, that the common seal of the Council was affixed to the proxy after due compliance with the requirements of Rule 4 of the Second Schedule to the Courts Ordinance. In such a case it cannot be contended that, under section 68 of the Evidence Ordinance, the plaintiff must call at least one of the attesting witnesses to prove the execution of the proxy.

In an action instituted by the Incorporated Council of Legal Education to have a tenant ejected from certain premises let on a monthly rent, the authority of the Council's proctor for having given the tenant notice to quit need not be proved if his authority to represent the Council in the action is, not questioned.

When a landlord accepts money sent to him as rent, from a tenant who overholds after receiving a notice to quit, a new contractual tenancy is not thereby created, unless it can be shown that the parties intended to and in fact created a new tenancy. If, for example, in every receipt issued it was stated that the payment was received " without prejudice to the notice to quit already given and the cause of action already arisen ", it is clear that the payments of rent were not accepted in respect of a new tenancy.

A monthly tenant (the defendant), before he became a statutory tenant, had been paying rent once in two months. After he became a statutory tenant, he could have lawfully relied on the tacit permission given by the landlord (the plaintiff) to continue to pay in that way. He did pay in that way until June 1954. But, from July 1954 the delay in making payments became longer and longer until there was gross and inexcusable delay just before the-present action was filed for ejectment of the tenant in terms of section 13(1) (a) of the Rent Restriction Act. Moreover, throughout the period of the statutory tenancy, the late payments of rent were accepted by the landlord without prejudice, which meant that they were not to affect the notice to quit.

, that the tenant had clearly failed to perform his obligation as a statutory tenant and was, therefore, liable to be evicted under section 13 (1) (a) of the Rent Restriction Act. In such a case, the equitable principle of promissory estoppel cannot provide the tenant with a defence.

from a judgment of the Court of Requests, Colombo.

with and for the Defendant-Appellant.

with and , for the Plaintiff-Respondent.

February 19, 1963.
The Plaintiff in this action is The Incorporated Council of Legal Education and the Defendant is a Proctor. It is common ground that the Defendant Was a tenant of the Plaintiff prior to October 1952 in respect of premises No. 250/6, Hulftsdorf Street, on a monthly rent of Rs. 32-08. On 31st October, 1952, Messrs Julius & Creasy, claiming to act on behalf of the Plaintiff, gave the Defendant notice to quit the premises on or before 31st January, 1953. In that notice they also-stated that the premises were required for the purpose of their clients. In spite of that notice the Defendant continued to occupy the premises, and he is still there.