Samayawardhena, J.

The plaintiff instituted this action in the District Court of Batticaloa against the defendants seeking a declaration that they are the tenants of the plaintiff and ejectment of them from the premises in suit on the grounds of reasonable requirement and arrears of rent. In their answer, the defendants admitted that they were tenants but denied that the premises were reasonably required by the plaintiff or that arrears of rent were outstanding. In paragraph 12 of the plaint, the plaintiff averred that she had given one month’s notice terminating the tenancy. In paragraph 11 of the answer, however, the defendants specifically pleaded that, as tenants within the meaning of the Rent Act No. 7 of 1972, such one month’s notice was invalid in law, and therefore the action could not be maintained. This matter was put in issue at the trial. It is significant that at no stage did the plaintiff contend that the premises were outside the ambit of the Rent Act.

After trial, the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s action on the ground that the notice to quit was not valid in law, holding that under section 22(6) of the Rent Act the plaintiff was required to give one year’s notice.

On appeal, the High Court of Civil Appeal of Batticaloa affirmed the judgment of the District Court and dismissed the appeal. The present appeal, filed with leave of this Court, is against the judgment of the High Court. A previous bench of this Court granted leave to appeal on the following questions of law:

(a) Did the High Court of Civil Appeal misdirect itself in holding that the respondents were tenants, in view of their denial of the appellant’s title?

(b) In any event, was the notice to quit valid in the circumstances of the case?

The first question suggests that the defendants denied the plaintiff’s title. Even assuming that the defendants denied the plaintiff’s title, they did not deny that they were tenants under the plaintiff. For the continuance of a landlord–tenant relationship, it is not necessary that the landlord be the owner of the premises. A valid tenancy agreement may come into existence even between a trespasser and another, though such an agreement would not bind the true owner.

There had also been a previous litigation (Case No. 3510/L) between the predecessors of the present parties. The plaintiff contends that in that action the defendants claimed ownership of the premises, which was not accepted by Court, and that the plaintiff’s ownership was upheld. The plaintiff now argues that the defendants cannot approbate and reprobate by asserting ownership in the earlier case and tenancy in the present action. If that was indeed the plaintiff’s position, the proper course would have been to seek ejectment of the defendants in the earlier action itself. In this regard, section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code becomes relevant.

34(1) Every action shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the action within the jurisdiction of any court.

(2) If a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes any portion of, his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. A person entitled to more than one remedy in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of his remedies; but if he omits (except with the leave of the court obtained before the hearing) to sue for any of such remedies, he shall not afterwards sue for the remedy so omitted.

(3) For the purpose of this section, an obligation and a collateral security for its performance shall be deemed to constitute but one cause of action.

The premises had been transferred by the predecessor of the plaintiff to the predecessor of the defendants by a deed, which the plaintiff stated was not an outright transfer but security for a loan. In the previous case, the Court held that the defe