QUEEN v. DANIEL.

D. C, Kegalla, 836.

Right to appeal for enhancement of punishment-Section 406 of the Criminal Procedure Code-Error of law or of fact-Error in point of opinion- Right of party injured or other private complainant to appeal, in a case where the parties are the Crown and the accused-Application for revision of proceedings under s. 426-Necessity for notice of revision.

An appeal for enhancement of punishment is permissible on the ground of error of fact or of law, in cases where both imprisonment and fine have been imposed, and in the cases not excepted in sections 403,404, and 405 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Error in point of opinion on the part of a Judge as to the degree of injury to a complainant, or the degree of criminality of an accused, or as to the nature or amount of punishment inflicted, does not amount to an error in law.

Insufficiency of punishment could only be an error in law when a minimum amount of penalty had been prescribed but had not been imposed.

In a criminal prosecution by the Crown, the party injured or other private complainant has not the right of appeal provided for in section 406 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

An application for revision under section 426 will not be entertained without due notice to the respondent.

THE indictment in this case charged the accused with having  voluntarily caused grievous hurt to one Mr. Dharmaratna.

The accused pleaded provocation, and admitted that he struck him as hard as he could with the fist on the eye and on the ear once or twice, and threw him out of the verandah. The District Judge found the accused guilty, and " sentenced him to simple ' imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to a fine of Rs. 50." The Attorney-General appealed on the ground that the judgment of the Court below was not in conformity with the requirements of section 372 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and that the sentence imposed on the accused was far too inadequate in view of the circumstances of the case.

Dornhorst, for the accused, urged by way of preliminary object on that, as inadequacy of sentence was neither an error of law nor of fact, the appeal preferred should be rejected. He contended that no appeal lay in the present case under sections 404 or 405 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and that if the appeal be taken as one from a " party " as provided in section 406, it could be entertained only on the ground of error of law or fact, but not for mere error of opinion on the part of