WIMAL WITHANA V. PANEER SELVAM AND HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL
2012 SLR 1 254
WIMAL WITHANA
V.
PANEER SELVAM AND HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUPREME COURT
AMARATUNGA, J.,
SRIPAVAN, J.AND IMAM, J.
S. C.APPEAL No.123/2009
S.C. (SPL) .L.A.APPLICATION No.139/2009
M.C. MT. LAVINIA CASE No. 1974/S/5
CASE No. HCRA 88/2006
CA (PHC) APPL. No.170/2007
JUNE 13TH, 2011
URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY LAW NO. 41 OF 1978, as amended - Section 23
Applicability Town and Country Planning Ordinance and other enactments in
development areas. - Section 28A(I)(a) to (c)- Could the The UDA, in order to
ensure compliance with the permit request the person to whom such
permit was issued to cease such development activity, to restore the land to its
original condition? - Section 28 A- Could the The UDA apply to the Magistrate in
terms of subsections 3(a) 'to obtain a mandatory order authorizing the UDA to
give effect to such notice- Sections 8A to Section 8H? - Manner in which a
development plan has to be prepared- Section 8J - Purpose of issuing a permit.
At the hearing before the Supreme Court an Counsel agreed to restrict their
argument to the following questions of law:
(1) Did the Court of Appeal err in law in interpreting Section 23(5) and
28(A)(3) of the Urban Development Authority Law as amended by Act, No.4 of 1982?
(2) Did the Court of Appeal misconstrue the provisions of the Urban Development
Authority Act, No.4 of 1982?
HELD:
(1) Every subsection under 28 A of the Act must be considered as a whole and
self-contained. It is not permissible to omit any part of it and must therefore
be read as part of an integral whole throwing light on the rest so that
harmonious construction be placed on them for the purpose of giving effect to
the legislative intent and object.
(2) The provisions contained in Section 28 A (3) fall within the scope of the
term "planning" and therefore the powers, duties and functions referred to
therein could be delegated by the UDA to any officer of a local authority.
Case referred to:
Jayasinghe V. Seethawakapura Urban Council (2003) 3 Sri L. R. 40 -
(distinguished)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Appeal
Jacob Joseph with Sandamalee Somarathna for the 1A Substituted -Applicant -
Petitioner -1st Respondent - Petitioner
V. Puvitharan with Ms. S. Kalugamage for the Respondent - Petitioner -
Petitioner -Respondent
M. Gunathilake S. S. C. for the 2nd Respondent - Respondent - Respondent -
Respondent
cur. adv. vult
January 18, 2012
SRIPAVAN. J.
The IA substituted-Applicant- Petitioner- 1st Respondent-Petitioner (hereinafter
referred to as the "Petitioner") in this application seeks to set aside the
judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 29th May 2009, on the basis that the Court
misconstrued certain provisions of the Urban Development Authority Law No. 41 of
1978 as amended.
Special Leave was granted by this Court on 21st October, 2009 on the questions
of law set out in paragraphs 11 (i), 11 (ii) and 11 (iii) of the amended
petition dated 29th September 2009. At the hearing before us, all Counsel agreed
to restrict their argument to the following two questions of law only:
(i) Did the Court of Appeal err in Law in interpreting Section 23(5) and
28(A)(3) of the Urban Development Authority Law as amended by Act No.4 of 1982?
(ii) Did the Court of Appeal misconstrue the provisions of the Urban Development
Authority Act No.4 of 1982?
On 1st July 2005, the Petitioner instituted an action in the Magistrate's Court of Mt Lavinia in terms of Section 28 (A) (3) of the Urban Development Authority Law No. 41 of 1978 as amended (hereinafter referred to as the "UDAAct") against the 1st Respondent-Petitioner-Petitioner-Respondent (hereinafter referred to as the "First Respondent") seeking an Order of demolition of an unauthorized construction. After hearing the parties, the Learned Magistrate on 28th April 2006 made a mandatory order authorizing the demolition of the said unauthorized construction, by the Urban Development Authority. The revisi