BUDDHARAKITA TERUNNANSE v. GUNASEKARA.

BUDDHARAKITA TERUNNANSE v. GUNASEKARA.

D. C, Colombo, letter B.

Joint lessors-action for rent by one lessor for his share of rent-subsequent action by joint lessors-Splitting of cause of action-Civil Procedure Code, 8. 34-cancellation of Lease-rights of joint creditors.

A and B being joint lessors, A sued the lessee for his half share of the rent on the lease for a certain period, making B a party defendant to the action, and requiring them to show cause, if any, why judgment for half the rent should not go in favour of A. A recovered judgment. Subsequently both A and B sued the lessee for the other half share of the rent for the above period, and for the whole of the rent for a subsequent period, and for a cancellation of the lease.

Held, that this action was maintainable, and that it was not barred by section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Held further, that in the case of joint lessors, each can sue the lessee separately for his moiety of the rent.

Held further, that when a lease contains the stipulation that, in default of payment of rent by the lessee, the lessor should be at liberty . to sue the lessee for a cancellation of the lease, the lessor is under no liability to seek a cancellation at the default, but that he may sue for and recover the rent at each of several defaults and sue for a cancella­tion of the lease at any subsequent-default.

Per Withers, J.-When creditors have joined in stipulating for the 1895.payment of a sum of money, each is entitled to his quota of that sum. When several debtors join in promising to pay a sum of money, each is liable to pay a quota of that sum of money, and no more. This happens even when a plurality of debtors or creditors intervene by the death of a single creditor or debtor leaving several heirs-at-law.

THIS was an appeal from an order of the Court below rejecting   a plaint on the ground stated at length in the judgment of his Lordship the Chief Justice.

Pereira, for plaintiff appellant. The District Judge has held that the present action is barred by section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code. That section enacts that every action shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action, and it applies to the case of a single plaintiff suing for a part only of his claim in respect of one cause of action, and then suing for the remainder in a separate action. In the present case, however, there was no splitting of the cau

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