QUEEN  v. CARA et al.

D. C., Kalutara (Criminal), 650.

Criminal Procedure Code, s. 18-Sentence-Power of Court to give aggregate punishment-Distinct offences.

Under section 18 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is competent for a District Court to pass sentences on an accused person aggregating four years.

But such a power should not be exercised except when the offences of which the accused is convicted are completely distinct in their character.

THE persons accused in this case -were convicted of house--L breaking by night in order to commit theft (under section 443) and of committing theft in the same building used as a human dwelling (under section 369 of the Penal Code), and each of the accused were sentenced " to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years for the first offence, and further to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years for the second offence, the several terms of imprisonment to commence imme­diately after the expiry of the first term ; in all to undergo each four years' rigorous imprisonment."

On appeal preferred by the accused, Dornhorst (with him Jayawardana) appeared for them.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, but ordered the sentence passed on each of the appellants to be reduced from four to two years, for reasons given in the following judgment :

16th December, 1895. WlTHERS, J.

Notwithstanding the able way in which he put his appeal, Mr. Dornhorst failed to convince me that the verdict arrived at is a wrong one.

I reserved consideration of the sentences passed on the appellants.

The 18th section of the Criminal Procedure Code seems to me clearly to enact that, when a person is convicted at one trial of two or more distinct offences, the Court may sentence him for such offences to the several punishments prescribed therefor, which such Court is competent to inflict, provided that if the case is tried by a District or Police Court, the aggregate shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which such Court in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction is competent to inflict.

Hence a District Court is competent in such a case to pass sentences aggregating four years.

Such a power should not, however, be exercised except when the offences are completely distinct in their character. The distinct character of the offences will be best indicated by the intention of the offender. If, e.g., the dominant intention is to injure the person, there should be but one punishment, though the transaction in its entirety discloses more than one injury to the same person. If the transaction, on the other hand, disclo