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ABEYAKOON v. SODALAYANDI ACHARI
NLR4V151
ABEYAKOON v. SODALAYANDI ACHARI.
D. C, Kegalla, 21,367.
Penal Code, s. 183-Obstructing public servant in discharge of public duty- Meaning of voluntary obstruction-Punishment for such offences.
Where a Deputy Fiscal, entrusted with a writ of possession, informed the accused, who was in possession of the house, that he had come to place the purchaser in execution in possession, but the accused in an excited state said in anger to the Deputy Fiscal." It would be either my life or your life; you will have to cut my the oat before I am sent out; " and the Deputy Fiscal, apprehending something serious, did not give effect to the writ of possession:
Held, that the conduct of the accused, though devoid of physical resistance, amounted to criminal intimidation, and therefore to voluntary obstruction.
In the absence of special circumstances of aggravation, the punishment in such cases should not be greater than that which may be inflicted under section 326 of the Civil Procedure Code, namely, simple imprisonment, or a fine.
THE accused in this case was found guilty under section 183 of the Penal Code of obstructing the complainant as a public servant in the discharge of his duty as Deputy Fiscal of Kegalla, of putting the purchaser at a sale in execution in possession of certain lands described in the writ of possession which was issued from the District Court of Kegalla. The evidence of the complainant as regards the nature of the obstruction was as follows: - " I entrusted the writ of possession to a subordinate officer of " mine to put Muttyah Chetty, the purchaser, in possession; " he reported that the accused refused to leave the land. I went " to the land myself in consequence in December last. The defendant refused to vacate the premises. I went again on the " 16th April last, reaching the land at about 9 o'clock. I saw the " accused's wife, but the accused himself was absent. She refused " to go away. 1 came to the land again at 3 p.m. Both husband " and wife were in the house. I explained to them that I came " to place Muttyah Chetty in possession. The accused asked me " not to step into his house, and he threatened me if I came there " something serious would happen. He said it would either be " my life or your life; you will have to cut my throat before I " am sent out. He was very angry and in an excited state. I " apprehended that something serious would happen, and I was " therefore unable to put Muttyah Chetty in possession."
Accused appealed.
Bawa, for appellant.-It is not proved that accused barricaded his doors or assaulted the Deputy Fiscal, or took any active step to oppose the execution of the writ of possession. " Voluntary obstruction " in section 183 implies use of physical force. It cannot be said that the words used by the accused amount to such physical resistance (Queen-Empress v. Sommanna, I. L. R. 15 Madras 221), and it has been held in Queen-Empress v. Hussnin (I. L. R. 15 Bombay 564) that an oral statement to a bailiff that he would not be allowed to take away the articles does not amount to an offence under the corresponding section of the Indian Penal Code. [Bonser, C.J.-The first case cited only shows that the owner of the goods sought to be inventorized simply remained inside his house with his closed doors; and in the second case cited a person claiming certain goods which were lying on the road in front of the judgment-debtor's shop, which was sought to be attached, the owner told the bailiff that he would not let him take them away unless he entered them as the claimant's property. But in the present case there is evidence of intimidation, owing to which the Deputy Fiscal says he was obliged to desist' from his duty.] But there was no physical resistance here.
The sentence of three months' imprisonment is much too severe. A fine would be more consistent with the facts of the case.
Ramanathan, S.-G., for respondent, was not call
