RANGHAMI v. KIRIHAMY.

RANGHAMI v. KIRIHAMY.

D. C., Kandy, 14,928.

Jurisdiction-Action by trustee of Buddhist vihare to set aside lease-Improvident execution of lease by incumbent-Residence of defendant and site of lands leased outside jurisdiction of Court-Grounds of cause of action- Civil Procedure Code, s. 9.

    In an action raised by a trustee of a Buddhist Vihare against the lessee of certain lands to set aside the lease which had been executed within the jurisdiction of the District Court of Kandy, on the ground that such lease was an improvident alienation,-

    Held, that the true definition of " cause of action " was the act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint; that the wrongful act of the defendant complained of was done in Kandy, in accepting a lease from the incumbent which the latter had improperly executed for his own benefit and to the injury of the vihare; and that therefore the District Court of Kandy had jurisdiction to try the case, notwithstanding that the residence of the defendant and the site of. the lands were beyond its limits.

   THE facts of the case appear in the judgment of Layard, C.J.

    Van Langenberg, for appellant.

     H. Jayawardene, for respondent.

    4th June, 1903. LAYARD, C.J.-

    The only question raised in this case is whether the Kandy District Court has jurisdiction.

    The plaintiff is the trustee of a vihare situated within the jurisdiction of the Kandy District Court, and he brings this action

to set aside a deed of lease executed by the incumbent of the vihare alleging, as his cause of action, that the deed of lease was for a longer term than was consistent with the interests of the vihare, and was an improvident alienation of the property leased. He further alleges that the consideration for the lease was inadequate and for the private benefit of the incumbent. He prayed, for the reasons given above, that the lease may be set aside, and the relief he seeks for is to be placed in possession of the lands.

    The lands are situated outside the jurisdiction of the District Court of Kandy. The objection was raised in the Court below, and by the appellant in this Court, that as the defendant resided outside the jurisdiction of the Kandy District Court, and the lands leased were also outside the jurisdiction of that court, the Kandy District Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.

    Now, the jurisdiction of District Courts is laid down by section 9 of the Ordinance No. 2 of 1889 to be (1) over parties resident within its jurisdiction, (2) over land situated, in whole or in part, within its jurisdiction, (3) where ±he cause of action has arisen within its jurisdiction, or (4) where the contract sought to be enforced was made. The question then is whether the cause of action in this case arose within the jurisdiction of the Kandy District Court.

    Cause of action, for the purposes of our Civil Procedure Code, has been defined, amongst other things, as "a wrong for the prevention or redress of which an action may be brought. " The wrong alleged here appears to be the execution of a lease within the jurisdiction of the District Court of Kandy, whereby an injury to the temple revenues payable to the trustee within such jurisdiction was inflicted. From the definition given by our statute it appears therefore to me that the Kandy Court has jurisdiction in this case. If we look to the English decisions with regard to the definition given to " cause of action, " we find Brett, J., in Cooke v. Gill, reported in L. R. 8 C. P. 116, has defined cause of action as meaning " every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed; every fact which the defendant would have a right to traverse. "

    Applying that definition to this case, the fact that was material to be proved was, that the lease was executed, and that it was improvidently executed by

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