Present: Mr. Justice Wood Renton.

LYALL v. NARAYANAN.

P. C, Matale, 33,774.

    Ordinance No. 9 of 1909, s. 30-Quitting service-Notice by letter.

Section 20 of Ordinance No. 9 of 1909 does not prohibit a cooly from giving his employer notice of his intention to determine his contract of service by a letter which proceeds really from himself, even although it may have been prepared by a proctor.

A notice by an Indian cooly by a letter to which he set his mark, and which mark was authenticated by a proctor, was held sufficient to satisfy the provisions of section 20 of the Labour Ordinance.

APPEAL against an acquittal with the sanction of the Attorney General. The accused gave the complainant notice of his intention to determine his contract of service by a letter, to which he set his mark. This mark was authenticated by the signature of Mr. Proctor Pompeus, who certified that the accused set his mark to the letter in his presence. It was also proved that the accused understood the contents of the letter when he set his mark to it. The complainant, who admitted the receipt of the letter, charged the accused for quitting service without giving notice in terms of section 20 of Ordinance No. 9 of 1909. The Police Magistrate held that the letter was sufficient notice, and acquitted the accused.

The complainant appealed.

A St. V. Jayewardene, for appellant.-The construction placed on section 20 of the new Ordinance by the Police Magistrate would in effect nullify the object of the Ordinance, which was to require the cooly to give notice in person. Prior to this Ordinance notices were given either personally or by agent (i.e., proctor or kangany). The giving of notices by agents had led to grave abuses, and was one of the matters referred to the Labour Commission and dealt with by them, as shown by their report. [WOOD RENTON J.-Do you (respondent) object to the report of the Commission being referred to ? Mr. Wadsworth objected.] Portions of the report may be read to show to this Court the evils and abuses which this Ordinance intended to remedy. Counsel referred to In re Mew v. Thorne,1[1 31 L. J. Bankruptcy 87.] Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, p. 37.

The Commission recommended that in the event of any cooly on an estate desiring to give notice or to apply for his tundu, he be required to appear before the superintendent, and that notice given on his behalf by his kangany or other agent, unless subsequently personally confirmed by him, should be deemed invalid (Report of the Labour Commission, paragraph 30, p. xii). In the " object and reasons " attached to the draft Ordinance it is stated

that it is introduced to give effect to the recommendations of the Jan. 27,1910 Labour Commission.

The present case is an attempt to evade the letter and the spirit of the law. This clearly amounts to giving notice by an agent. Formerly the agent himself used to sign the notice, but now he attests the signature of the cooly. The requirement of the law that the cooly should " personally signify " his intention would become a dead letter, if the accused's contention be upheld..

Wadsworth, for the respondent. In construing an Ordinance we have no right to look into reports of Commissions and parliamentary debates [Attorney-General v. Sillem 1[1 (1863) 2 H. and C. 521.]), except where there is any ambiguity in the words (Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, p. 39). The words of section 20 are clear.

In this case the notice given by the cooly is not a notice given by-an agent. The Ordinance does not prohibit the giving of notice by letter'. If notice has to be given in person, a cooly who is ill may not be able to give notice. The Ordinance is a penal statute, and must be strictly construed. " Personally " does not mean in person.

Jayewardene, in reply, cited sections 25 and 8 of the Civil Procedure Code to show what " personally " meant.

January 27