Kistnappa Chetty V. Silva Et Al.

Aug.23,1911     Present: Lascelles C.J. and Middleton J.

KISTNAPPA CHETTY v. SILVA et al.

241-D. C. Colombo, 31,377.

Cancellation of stamp-Promissory note- Antedating stamp-Ordinance No. 22 of 1909, s. 9.

A promissory note was made on January 4, 1909, and the stamp was affixed and was cancelled on that date by the maker, but in cancelling the note he put the date of January 1, 1910, instead of January 4, 1910.

Held, that the stamp was sufficiently cancelled.

Lascelles C.J.-The language of section 9 of the Stamp Ordinance of 1909 leaves no doubt that sub-section (3) is optional and not imperative.

THE facts appear from the judgment.

Walter Pereira, K.C. (with him Sandrasagra), for the appellants.- The method of cancelling a stamp is indicated by section 9, sub-section (3), of Ordinance No. 22 of 1909. The person cancelling

has to write " the true date of his so writing." The word " may " in sub-section (3) cannot be interpreted to mean that the provisions of that sub-section need not be complied with in every case. The object of the section is to protect the revenue; if any date could be written on the stamp, the revenue would not be protected. It would be highly dangerous to hold that a maker of a note could antedate the cancellation of a note.

Sampayo, K.C., for the plaintiff, respondent.-Sub-section (3) gives only one of the modes of cancellation of a stamp by way of an illustration; it does not say that it is the only mode of cancellation. The object of cancelling a stamp is to prevent its being used again. Whether a person puts the actual date of cancellation or any other date the object is attained. Postdating may not be a sufficient mode of cancellation, for the stamp may be used again; but antedating prevents the stamp from being used again. The corresponding section of the Indian law is section 12 of the Indian Stamp Act of 1899. Sub-section (3) of the Indian Act has the additional words " or in any other effectual manner." But it was held in India in Virbhadarapa v. Bhimaji1 that these words did not effect any change in the law of India; and that the words were added in the new Stamp Act of India to make the law clearer. The method of cancellation indicated in sub-section (3) is not obligatory; it is only intended as a guide. Virbhadarapa v. Bhimaji.1

Counsel cited Pitche Cannen Asary v. Asary; 2 Moorgappa Chetty v. Silva; 3 Bhawanji Harbhum v. Doji; 4 Alpe's Law of Stamp Duties, p. 22; Donogh's Indian Stamp Law, pp. 12 and 117.

Walter Pereira, K.C., in reply.

Cur. adv. vult.

August 23, 1911. Lascelles C.J.-

This is an action on a primissory note, to which the defendants, who are the executors of the maker, pleaded that the note was a forgery; and also that it was inadmissible in evidence, on the ground that it had not been duly stamped within the meaning of section 9 of the Stamp Ordinance of 1909. The only ground of appeal now taken is that which relates to the stamping of the promissory note. It appears that the note was made on January 3 or 4, and that the stamp was affixed and was cancelled on that date by the maker, but that in cancelling the note he put the date January 1 instead of the 3rd or the 4th of that month. The explanation given is that the note in question was a renewal of a note which had expired on January 1, and that the maker affixed that date on the note with some idea of preserving the continuity of the transaction. However that may be, the question arises whether the note has been duly cancelled in the manner provided by section 9. Now, in order to

1 28 Bom. 432.                                                                                 3 Wendt's Rep. 351.

2 (1882) Wendt's Rep. 41.                                                             4 (1894) 19 Bom. 635 at page 638.

ascertain the meaning of the section, it is necessary to regard it as a whole. The section is divided into three sub-sections: the first s

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