Present: Lascelles C.J.

PRICE v. SUPPAN

Notice cancelling notice to quit-Must be given to employer, and not to agent of employer-Ordinance No. 13 of 1889, s. 3-Ordinance No. 9 of 1909, s. 20.

A notice by a cooly to cancel a previous notice to quit (like the original notice to quit) must be given to the employer (and not to his agent).

An " employer " is the chief person, for the time being, in charge of an estate, and includes the superintendent.

The question whether a person is or is not an " employer " within the meaning of the Ordinance is one of fact. It is not concluded by the circumstance that he was the Assistant Superintendent, and not the Superintendent, of the estate, for it may well be that an Assistant Superintendent is at a certain time the chief person in direct charge of the estate, and the only person in authority who is accessible to the labourers.

APPEAL with the sanction of the Attorney-General. The facts are set out in the judgment.

Grenier, for appellant.-Section 3 of Ordinance No. 3 of 1889 defines the term " employer " as the chief person for the time being in charge of the estate. Here Mr. Price, though he was Assistant Superintendent of the estate, was in charge of the estate. And even if he cannot be called employer, he acted as agent of Mr. Coles, the employer, and as such the notice of revocation given to the agent is good in law.

Wadsworth, for respondent.-The question as to who the accused's employer was is a question of fact. The original notice to quit was given to Mr. Coles, the Superintendent. The present prosecution was at the instance of Mr. Coles. Mr. Price himself stated that he charged the accused with the authority of Mr. Coles. At the end of the trial the charge itself was amended by alleging that the accused quitted the service of Mr. Coles, and not that of the complainant, Mr. Price. Under our law there is no provision for an agent of the employer to give or receive notice. The notice to quit must be given to the employer, and consequently any revocation of that notice must be given to him.

May 9, 1912. Lascelles C.J.-

This is an appeal, with the sanction of the Attorney-General, from the acquittal of the accused on a charge preferred against him by Mr. Price, the Assistant Superintendent of Nilembe estate, of having illegally quitted the complainant's service on March 4, 1912. It was proved that Mr. Coles, who, I understand, is the Superintendent of the estate, received a notice of their intention to quit his service signed by the accused and other coolies. Subsequently some coolies denied that they had signed the notice, and Mr. Price questioned the accused whether he had signed the notice, and whether he wished to leave the estate and the accused, while admitting that he had signed the notice, stated that he wished to cancel it and remain on the estate. On March 4 accused left the estate, and was at once charged by Mr. Price. The accused then stated that he wished to leave the estate. The learned Police Magistrate acquitted the accused, on the ground that the accused's statement of his intention to cancel the notice being made to Mr. Price, and not to Mr. Coles, did not amount to a valid revocation of the notice to quit.

In appeal it was contended that Mr. Price was the " employer " within the meaning of the Ordinance, and that in any case Mr. Price, as the agent of Mr. Coles, was entitled to receive notice of the accused's wish to cancel the notice. Section 20 of " The Indian Coolies Ordinance 1909, " designates the " employer " as the proper person to receive notice of the labourer's intention to determine the contract of service, and section 3 of Ordinance No. 13 of 1889 defines the term " employer " to mean the chief person, for the time being, in charge of an estate, and to include the superintendent. The question, therefore, whether Mr. Price was or was not the " employer " within