1912 Present: Lascelles C.J. and Wood Renton J.

SILVA v. FERNANDO.

232-D. C. Colombo, 33,516.

Quantum meruit-Quasi contract-Agreement to give share of plumbago for pumping water from, mine-How far persons who were not parties to agreement are bound to pay for services rendered.

B agreed to give A a one-fifteenth share of the plumbago from B's pit in consideration of A working certain pumping machinery, which drained the mines of A and B. C worked B's pit on an agreement with B. In an action by A against C, the District Judge held that the defendant was not bound by the agreement between A and B.

Held, on appeal, affirming the judgment, that plaintiff was not entitled to succeed even on a quantum meruit or on the basis of an implied contract.

THE facts appear sufficiently from the judgment.

Elliott, for the plaintiff, appellant.

No appearance for the respondent.

Cur. adv. vult.

July 5,1912. LASCELLES C.J.-

The plaintiff by his plaint averred that by indenture of February 15, 1908, made between the plaintiff of the one part and A. H. Fernando and others of the second part, it was agreed that the parties of the Second part should give the plaintiff a one-fifteenth share of the plumbago won from their respective mines in consideration of the plaintiff working certain pumping machinery, which drained the plumbago mines of the parties of the second part as well as that of the plaintiff; that A. H. Fernando carried out the agreement, as well as one Ponniah who worked A. H. Fernando's pit under an arrangement with Fernando; that the defendant subsequently worked the pit under an arrangement with Ponniah or Fernando, but has refused to pay one-fifteenth of the produce of the mine to the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims the value of the plumbago which the defendant should have paid on the footing of the agreement. The defence is that the plaint discloses no cause of action. The learned District Judge held that the defendant was not bound by the agreement, and threw out a suggestion that the plaintiff might have recovered on a quantum meruit. In the appeal it is not contended that the learned District Judge's finding with regard to the absence of any contract between the plaintiff and the defendant is wrong, but we are asked to allow the plaintiff an opportunity of basing his claim on a quantum meruit.

No authorities were cited to us by the appellant in support of the proposition that the plaintiff could recover on this footing. If the principles of the English law were applicable, the plaintiff's claim would not be sustainable on this ground. The law is thus stated by Bowen L.J. in Falcke v. The Scottish Imperial Insurance Co.1[ 34 Chan. Div. 249.]: " The general principle is, beyond all question, that work and labour done or money expended by one man to preserve or benefit the property of another do not, according to English law, create any lien upon the property saved or benefited, nor even, if standing alone, create any obligation to repay the expenditure. Liabilities are not to be forced upon people behind their backs any more than you can confer a benefit on a man against his will."

It cannot be said that in the present case the defendant by accepting the benefit of the plaintiff's pumping operations must be taken to have entered into a fresh contract. As is generally the case where the work is done on land, the circumstances are such as to give the defendant no option in the matter (Sumpter v. Hedges2[(1898) 1 Q. B. 673.]).

The advantage which the defendant's mine received from the plaintiff's pumping came to him whether he desired it or not; it was the natural consequence of the relative situations of the plaintiff's and the defendant's mines, and there is no principle of

English law which requires a person to contribute to an outlay merely because he has derived a material benefit from it. The Ruabon Steamship Company v. The London Assurance.1