[FULL BENCH.]

1917 Present : Wood Renton C.J. and Shaw and Ennis JJ.

THE KING v. SAMARAWIRA.

114-D. C. (Crim.) Negombo, 11,240.

Contempt of court-Interference with the possession of receiver appointed by Court-Power of District Court to punish.

Possession of land by a receiver appointed by a District Court is possession of the Court, and contumacious interference with the possession of the receiver is punishable as a contempt of court. Such contemptuous interference ex facie curia with the possession of the receiver is punishable by the Supreme Court only, and not by the District Court.

THIS case was reserved for argument before a Bench of three Judges by Ennis J. The facts appear from the judgment of the Chief Justice.

J. S. Jayewardene (with him Goonetilleke), for accused, appellant. -The jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court in matters of contempt is governed by section 51 of the Courts Ordinance, which especially provides for cases in which the lower courts have no jurisdiction under section 59 of the same Ordinance.

Section 59 provides only for two classes of cases. The comma after the word " respectively " does not indicate three classes of cases. Punctuation is no part of a statute (Shaw J. referred to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes).

Section 59 has always been construed in the manner submitted. Counsel referred to 1 N. L. R. 49, 1 N. L. R. 181, 1 C. W. R. 195,
2 S. C. R. 39, 8 N. L. R. 343, S S. C. R. 145, 1 Bal. Notes of Cases 52. 3 Bal. Notes of Cases 38.

Section 59 is exclusive and gives only a limited jurisdiction to District Courts (Ennis J. :-A District Court is a Court of Record and must have the same powers as a Court of Record in England). It is only the Superior Courts of Record in England that can exercise the jurisdiction contended for by the Crown. A District Court is an inferior Court (section 440 of the Criminal Procedure Code).

S. Obeyesekera. C.C., for the Crown.-Section 59 confers only a special jurisdiction. It does not affect the general jurisdiction of a Court of Record. Counsel referred to 7 S. C, C. 203, 3 Lor. 36. and Ramanathan (1863) 196. Bonser C.J. in 1 N. L. R. 306 did not accept the construction placed on section 59 in 1 N. L. R. 49. Section 59 must be construed to include three different classes of cases.

Jayewardene, in reply.-There were conflicting decisions prior to the Ordinance (1 Bel. & Vand. 152, 2 S. C. C. 192). There is  no procedure provided for the exercise of any other than the special jurisdiction (section 792 of the Civil Procedure Code). The case reported in 1 N. L. R. 49 is a Full Court case, and is binding on the Full Court.

Cur. adv. vult.

June 20, 1917. WOOD RENTON C.J.-

This case was referred by my brother Ennis to a Bench of three Judges for the determination of two points of law, viz., (i.) whether under the Courts Ordinance, 1889,1 section 59, or otherwise, a District Court has power to punish as contempt of court interference with the possession of land by a receiver appointed by the Court; and (ii.) whether the appointment of the receiver in the present case was itself invalid. It was agreed at the argument of the appeal that the latter of these questions should be dealt with by my brother Ennis sitting as a single Judge, and it is only necessary, therefore, to consider the former.

I entirely agree with the learned District Judge that the possession of a receiver is the possession of the Court, and that contumacious interference with that possession is punishable as contempt. That is the law of England,2 and I see no reason to doubt but that it is also the law of Ceylon. The point, indeed, is not devoid of local authority.3 But the serious question that arises on the facts in the present case is whether contemptuous interference ex facie curice with the possession of a receiver is punishable by the District Court or only by the Supreme Court. Section 59 of the