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WICKRAMASURIYA v. PERERA
NLR20V156
Present : De Sampayo J.
WICKERAMASURIYA v. PERERA.
777-P. C. Kalutara, 3,523.
Alteration
of building with permission of Chairman, Local board- Passing of the Homing and
Town Improvement Ordinance-Fresh permission unnecessary.
The accused obtained permission from the Chairman, Local board, for alteration
of a building, and carried on the building operations after the Ordinance came
into force.
Held, that a fresh approval of the Chairman, under section 10 of
the Ordinance, was not necessary.
THE
facts are set out in the judgment. Weeraratne, for
accused, appellant. Grenier, CO., for plaintiff, respondent.
October 8, 1917. DE SAMPAYO J.-
This is a prosecution under section 13 (1) of the Housing and Town
Improvement Ordinance, 1915, for making an alteration in a building without the
written consent of the Chairman, in contravention of section 10 of the
Ordinance. The accused obtained the requisite permission from the Chairman,
under the Local board Ordinance, in 1914, before the enactment of the Housing
and Town Improvement Ordinance, and he has since carried on building operations.
The alleged offence is the continuation of the building works after the latter
Ordinance came into operation, the standpoint of the prosecution being that the
accused required a fresh approval or consent from the Chairman under section 10
of this Ordinance. It is very questionable whether such continuation is an
"alteration" of the building within the meaning of section 10 of the Ordinance,
as the prosecution contends. Apart from that question, however, I may say that
in P. C. Kalutara, No. 44,552, which was a prosecution or allowing a building to
be occupied in contravention of section 15, and which was decided by me on
September 26, 1917, I stated my reasons for holding that the whole chapter of
this Ordinance, in which provisions relating to buildings are contained, was
inapplicable to buildings sanctioned and commenced under the previously existing
law. That decision applies to this case with equal force. I may also refer to
Hubbard v. Bromley District Council.1[1 (1905) 69 J. P. 437.] This
series of
reports is not available to me,
but Scholefields's Encyclopaedia of Local Government Law, vol. II., p. 55, gives
a note of the decision, to the effect that buildings in course of erection when
by-laws came into force were not subject to the by-laws as regards works carried
out on them after the by-laws came into operation.
In my opinion the charge cannot Re sustained. The conviction is set aside.
Set aside.
