FERANANDO v. FERANANDO
NLR23V453
Present : Bertram C.J. and De
Sampayo J.
FERNANDO v. FERNANDO.
37-D. C. Chilaw, 5136.
Security for costs of
appeal-May proctor execute bond ?-Bond executed by proctor in his office in
favour of Secretary-Is bond valid ?
Where a deed is tendered as security for costs of appeal and that security
has been approved, and the security bond is merely executed as an ancillary
matter to give effect to the arrangement, the proctor has sufficient authority
by virtue of his proxy to execute a hypothecary bond on behalf of his client.
A bond hypothecating immovable property as security for costs of appeal may be
executed before the Judge or the Secretary of the Court, and when the bond Was
executed by the proctor in his office in favour of the Secretary without
complying with the provisions of section 2 of Ordinance No. 7 of 1840, the bond
was held to be invalid.
A bond given to the Secretary of the Court cannot be considered as a bond given
to the Crown, and does not come within section 20 of Ordinance No. 7 of 1840.
THE
facts appear from the judgment.
A. St. V. Jayawardene, K.C. (with him H. W. Perera), for appellants.
E. W. Jayawardene (with him Croos-Dabrera), for respondents.
October 19,1921. BERTRAM C.J.-
Two preliminary objections have been taken in this case. The objections are to
the security bond executed with regard to the costs of the appeal. The first
objection is that the bond was not executed by the party, but only by his
proctor. The second objection is that it was not executed either before the
Judge or the Secretary, in accordance with the established practice.
With regard to the first point, that has never been fully considered by this
Court. There have been conflicting opinions expressed probably with regard to
the special circumstances of the cases. But it has never come before this Court
for formal decision. In the view we take of this case, it is not necessary to
give a decision now. But it may be observed that where a deed is tendered as
security and that security has been approved, and the security bond is merely
executed as an ancillary matter to give effect to the arrangement, there seems
very good ground for saying that the proctor has sufficient authority by virtue
of his proxy to execute a hypothecary
bond on behalf of his
client. The more serious point, however, is as regards the manner in which the
bond is executed. We have had occasion to consider this question before in the
case of Mohammado Thamby v. Pathumma.[1] We there proceeded on the basis of an
old decision {Queen's Advocate v. Tamba Pulle[2]). That case established an
exception to the general statutory rule that every mortgage of immovable
property must be executed in accordance with the requirements of Ordinance No. 7
of 1840. She Court; in establishing that exception said that the provisions of
section 2 of the Ordinance No. 7 of 1840 evidently referred to conventions
between parties, and not to judicial hypothecs constituted as this is by the
order of the Court. That exception has ever since been recognized. The question
is what did the Court mean by establishing it. I think it meant to rule that the
requirements of section 2 of Ordinance No. 7 of 1840 were not intended to apply
to hypothecary bonds executed as an incident in Judicial procedure before the
Court. It is quite true that the requirements of the rules and orders of that
day under which the security bond had to be executed in the presence of the
Court have disappeared from our legislation. But the practice has still remained
that bonds of this description should be executed either before the Judge or
before the Secretary as representing him. la considering the extent to which the
exception applies at the present day, I do not think that it is possible to
leave that circumstance out of account. I do not think the Court would ever have
said that the provisions in question did not apply to a bond give